


THE MILLENIUM

MOSQUES

A New Direction for Religious Literacy

Editors:

Jajang Jahroni & Irfan Abubakar



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Translated from the book under the title of

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ENRICHING RELIGIOUS LITERACY IN MOSQUES: AN INTRODUCTION

Jamhari Makruf & Idris Thaha

This book, *The Millennium Mosques: A New Direction for Religious Literacy*, attempted to fill the void in literacy for mosques. Recent published studies on religions, especially in Indonesia, have been dominated by books that discuss mosques from the historic, cultural, artistic and architectural point of views. Not many books have discussed the educational function of mosques especially when this vital function is linked to how mosques become a fertile ground for sowing the seeds of radicalism and intolerance in the nation's religious life.

As will be elaborated in this book, in a few cities in Indonesia post-reformation, mosques have been exposed to ideas and views filled with radicalism and intolerance. The *khatib* (preachers) and the *muballigh* (missioners) through various conventional and normative methods deliberately deliver these ideas and views and thus, enrich the mosques with these during Friday sermons and any religious sermons. Here they insert, for example, the idea of rejecting Pancasila as an ideology and the Republic of Indonesia which has been established by the nation's forefathers. Advices on *aqidah* (Islamic creed), *ibadah* (worship/pray), and *akhlak* (morals) are only used as a medium to deliver their radical and intolerant religious messages.

Mosques and other places of worship play a vital educational role. Mosques are not only used as a center of religious activities, but also educational, including social-political and economic-commercial, activities. During his move to Yatsrib, which is now

known as the city of Madinah, the Prophet Muhammad SAW built a mosque and turned it into a center of his religious activities to build an Islamic civilization. The Prophet used the mosques to teach the new Muslim converts basic knowledge on the religion they had just embraced. This lesson in Islamic history shows that in its early development, mosques were the medium for spreading the Islamic messages or missionary work as well as teaching and learning Islam. Mosques were then further developed into the center of Islamic studies famously known as “*Masjid Jami*”. This *Masjid Jami* was developed into an Islamic institution known as “*al-jami’ah*” (a university). Therefore, it can be said that mosques are the root of higher education institutions although not all mosques have the function of a *jami’* or become higher education institutions.

Recently, however, the role of mosques has gone beyond worship and missionary work. Mosques are now complemented with schools or *madrasah* (after-school religious classes), health centers such as clinics, public services such as weddings and commercial centers such as shops, banks, offices, storages and other business activities. Mosques become the Islamic community’s source of not only knowledge, faith and belief, but also economy. These activities are all done to optimize the roles of mosques and to turn mosques into one of the most important centers to bring back an Islamic civilization.

In Indonesia, especially in Jakarta, the Al-Azhar Grand Mosque in Kebayoran Baru is an example of a good mosque. The mosque has various educational facilities starting from a kindergarten to a university. Although not as successful, two other mosques in Jakarta: Islamic Center Mosque located in Kramat Tunggak, a former prostitution complex, and Sunda Kelapa Mosque, are also good examples.

What about other mosques in Indonesia? Optimizing mosques is a must and a hope for the Muslims. There are thousands of mosques built both in rural and urban areas across the country. The grand mosques are built in the provinces, regents/cities, or districts while smaller mosques are built in the neighborhoods and villages. Mosques are also built in educational institutions (schools, campuses, Islamic boarding schools), government institutions as well as private and state-owned companies.

The roles and functions of these mosques need to be optimized to shape the belief and the characters of the Muslim community. Since most mosques in Indonesia are autonomically managed, the managers - the *takmir* (administrator), the *imam* (the leaders of the prayers), and the *khatib* (the preachers), who are normally members of the community, have the autonomy to optimize the roles of the mosque according to their understanding of Islam. Therefore, it is not unusual for some mosques to be branded radical and intolerant since the managers themselves embrace such view. The Islamism of a mosque can be said to be a reflection of the view of the managers and will affect the advancement of religious literacy in the mosque. It can be clearly seen that mosques have played a vital role in shaping, promoting and establishing religious literacy in the community.

Conducted by the Center for the Study of Religion and Culture (CSRC) in UIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta, this study discusses mosques in the millennium era and links mosques to such roles. The study may contribute to the improvement of education and the understanding of religious literacy among the youth and may lay the groundwork to increase the roles of present-day and future mosques.

We hope that mosque's managers - the *takmir*, the *imam*, and the *khatib* - may also increase their roles in spreading the peaceful words of a *rahmatan lil-'alamin* (merciful) Islam to their congregation so that the religious literacy in the mosque does not create division and animosity among the Muslims and towards the believers of other religions.

Jakarta, January 2019.

FOREWORD FROM THE EDITORS

Jajang Jahroni & Irfan Abubakar

As the largest Muslim country in the world, according to Indonesia's Ulama Council, Indonesia has an estimated 800,000 mosques spread across the country. Therefore, there is roughly a mosque for every 200 Indonesian Muslims and the distance between mosques is around 500 m. This statistic may show Indonesian Muslims' degree of piety. A survey conducted by CSRC (2011) found that 99% of Indonesian Muslims claimed that they performed daily prayers although they didn't do them regularly. This mandatory ritual, however, is not truly reflected in the social life. Another survey conducted by Rehman dan Askari (2010) on "how Islam are Islamic countries" revealed an irony. From 208 countries researched, Indonesia ranked 140. Although how religion affects social life is still debatable, it is clear that Islamic teaching emphasizes on the religion's benefits to social life and humanity. If we place our hope in mosques in optimizing their roles in shaping the community's characters, the *takmirs* no doubt have the same hope. They view mosques as more than a place of worship, but also an ideal place for educating religious literacy. The question is what and how religious literacy is taught in mosques. A few studies concluded that lessons in religious literacy in mosques only covered *ibadah* (worship/pray), *aqidah* (Islamic creed) and *akhlaq* (morals).

These themes are delivered normatively by the *ustadz* - an Arabic term for Islamic scholars/teachers - or *kyai* - an Indonesian term for Islamic scholars/teachers - through sermons. However,

not many of sermons discuss social-humanity themes such as science and technology, work ethos, literacy, peace, conflict resolution, etc. from the perspective of Islam. While all accept the concept of a peaceful Islam, only a few discuss this concept in the mosque. In big cities such as Jakarta, only 8% of all *takmir*s allow Muslim academicians to become speakers in mosques (CSRC, 2010).

Most of us were shocked when we learned that mosques had a tendency to be radical. We were also shocked to find religious intolerance practiced by a few mosques. The politization of mosques in the midst of heated election campaigns had clearly created a division among the community. The latest study done by CSRC UIN Jakarta in 2018 on religious literacy in mosques in 7 cities took its data from interviewing the *takmir*s and their two main partners: *khatib* and *imam*. The study found that the religious literacy was given traditionally through sermons discussing the topics of *ibadah*, *aqidah* and *akhlaq*, but issues of social and humanity were almost never discussed in-depth especially from the perspective of Islam.

According to al-Syami, a Ushul Fiqh scholar from the University of Sudan, in his book titled *Fiqh al-dîn* and *al-tadayyun* (2018), our mosques carried out the *Fiqh al-dîn* education but did not pay enough attention in *Fiqh al-tadayyun* education. While *Fiqh al-dîn* provided the basis for religious understanding from the main texts of Islamic teaching: the Qur'an and the Hadiths, *Fiqh al-tadayyun* provided perspectives and inspirations on how the religion had been practiced in its social-historical contexts. *Fiqh al-dîn* developed the normative belief while *Fiqh al-tadayyun* gave inspiration, enriched perspectives and strengthened wisdom in practicing the religion in the context of constantly changing life.

Moore (2010), an expert in culture from the Harvard University, emphasized that the global community had to increase its religious literacy since a good quality of religious literacy might improve relationship among members of community on the basis of mutual understanding and respect.

This book discusses religious literacy practiced in mosques, the challenges the mosques face and actions taken by the mosques. The researchers, the mosque and religious literacy observers discuss these issues from a slightly different perspective. Irfan

Abubakar explores the issues from the historical perspective by tracing back the phases of establishment, progresses and regresses of religious literacy and the roles of mosques in Islamic history. He talks about how Muslims in the past initially practiced *Fiqh al-dîn* and *Fiqh al-tadayyun* in their daily life together with the Prophet and his Companions. Referring to Moore's theory (2010), Irfan differentiates religious learning and learning about religions. Moore further explains that while the first is normative-sectarianist, the latter is contextual-objective. Viewing it from these concepts, the writer attempts to capture snapshots of contemporary religious literacy practices in a number of mosques in Indonesia.

In the second chapter, Jajang Jahroni analyzes the popularity of Salafism in Indonesia in the last decade and looks at its influences in mosque's politization phenomenon which has become a hot topic nowadays. Is it true that Salafism threatens the harmonious life of the Muslim community in Indonesia? This is, of course, an interesting topic to discuss. Similarly, Rita Pranawati looks at radicalism in mosques and its root causes. She specially discusses the meaning of the survey finding which discovered that 40% of the mosques in DKI Jakarta had been infiltrated by a radical ideology.

In Chapter 4, Abdul Wahid zooms in on tolerance in mosques and its influences in the formation of a multicultural community. In this chapter, Wahid closely looks at the practice of tolerance discourse in mosques in Mataram City, NTB. He discusses the answer to a worrying question: Does the construction of an Islamic Center in Mataram equal to the formation of a multicultural community in Pulau Seribu Mosque? In the final chapter, Afton Lubi discusses the relationship between mosques and the millennium generation. In this digital era, the Muslim youth are involuntarily sucked into a digital life. They learn from *ustadz* Google, listen to *khatib* Youtube and conduct their Islamic studies with preachers in Instagram. Have they left mosques or have the mosques left them?

This book attempts to explore the possibility of building a new direction in religious literacy in our mosques.

We hope you enjoy reading this book!

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Examining the Root of Radicalism in Mosques

Rita Pranawati

A. MOSQUES AND THEIR ROLES IN HISTORY

Since Islamic civilization began, mosques have played an important role in Muslims' life. Mosques have allowed the Muslims to meet face-to-face, to create a bond among them and also to unite their thoughts. Throughout the history, mosques have not only been a center of worship, but also a center of Muslim empowerment as well as civilization. In mosques, the Islamic missionary work, or well-known to the Muslims as *dakwah*, is planned, formulated and spread.

Linguistically, a mosque means a place to bow heads to worship Allah SWT. This is because a mosque is *isimmakan* from *sajada yasjudu, sujudan*. Although a hadith narrated by HR Bukhori says that people can bow their heads in any place as long as the place fulfills the requirements (of a place to pray), to gather the Muslims in one place, the Prophet Muhammad built the first mosque, the Quba Mosque, after he moved to Madinah.

The Qur'an Surah al-Taubah [9]:108 says that the Muslims are advised to pray in a mosque if they want to become one of the pure people and if they want to purify themselves. Aside from that, a hadith narrated by HR Bukhori Muslim says that the Prophet says, The earth has been made for me a mosque and a means of purification.¹ This means that mosques are not only made as

1 Muhammad bin Ismail al-Bukhari, Sahih al-Bukhari (Beirut: Dar Ibn Katsir al-Yamamah, n.d.), p.335; Also see Muslim bin al-Hajjaj, Sahih Muslim (Beirut: Dar Ihya' at-Turats al- Araby, n.d.), p.523 in Agus Sunaryo, Masjid dan Ideologisasi Radikalisme Islam: Menyoal Peran Masjid Sebagai Media Transformasi Ideologi, AKADEMIKA, Vol. 22, No 01 January-June 2017.

a place to bow (pray) but also a place for other activities which reflect our devotion to Allah SWT. Religious rituals do not only have spiritual meanings but also social, economic, education and even political meanings.² This is shown in the Qur'an Surah Al-Jin Verse 18: "Mosques belong to Allah, so do not invoke anyone with Him."

If mosques were only for praying, the Prophet did not need to take so much efforts in building them. The historical evidences shows that in mosques, the Prophet built the community's social life, to regulate not only relationship among people in the community, but also relationship among people, nature and *hablum minallah*. Mosques became the place to learn, to hold discussion, to discuss strategies for wars, to look after the casualties for wars until to receive guests from other countries.³

After the Quba Mosque, the next mosque that *Rasulullah* built was the Nabawi Mosque. In the Nabawi Mosque, *Rasulullah* intensively gave lessons and taught classes there. The lesson might about laws and rules, society, and the sources of Islamic teachings. A group of people, the *ahl al-Shuffah*, also used the mosque to learn the religion specially. Furthermore, the Nabawi mosque was also the center of Islamic information, the place to settle legal matters and disputes in the community, and the center of social and political activities.⁴

Mosques were also one of the places used by the incumbent rulers to solidify their power and dominance. Through sermons and religious literacy⁵, the Abbasiyah and Umayyah Dynasty or Syiah and Sunni used mosques directly and indirectly for their propaganda. One example was the naming of the Caliph that the preacher or the mosque supported at the end of their Friday sermon. Another example was the Al-Azhar Mosque in Cairo which was the main mosque in its era. It was established by the Fatimiyah Dynasty to increase the Syiah influence in the region.

From the explanation above, it can be seen that mosques have not only been the center of compulsory religious rituals and

2 *Ibid*

3 Haidz Dasuki, *et al*, Ensiklopedi Islam, III, (Jakarta: PT Icthiar Baru, 1994), p.176; Also see M. Quraish Shihab, *Wawasan al-Qur'an*, (Bandung: Mizan, 2001), p.462.

4 Aziz Muslim, *Manajemen Pengelolaan Masjid*, dalam *Jurnal Aplikasia (Aplikasi Ilmu-ilmu Agama)*, Vol V, No. 2 December 2004, pp.105-114.

5 Amelia Fauzia, "Faith and the State: A history of Islamic Philanthropy in Indonesia" PhD Dissertation, University of Melbourne, 2008, pp.59-77.

the places for learning Islam, but also the driver of social and economic activities in the community. During the Prophet's era, the Quba Mosque was used as the place for teaching Islam and the Nabawi Mosque was used to strengthen the community.⁶ The Prophet himself showed the people how to strengthen the many roles of the mosques - as the center of religious education, the center of missionary work, as well as the center of community and economy.

After the death of the Prophet until the golden era of the Abbasiyyah dynasty, there were not big changes in the roles of the mosques. The main functions of the mosques stayed the same which were the centers for missionary work, social, economic and educational activities. During this era, however the mosque also served a particular function for the government. It became the central place for the government to hold discussions among government officials and between the government and the community.⁷

Wherever there are Islamic communities, there will mosques. Based on the data from the Ministry of Religious Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia, there are 31 provincial mosques, 4,305 big mosques, 851 historical mosques, 486 municipal mosques, 203,506 village mosques, dan 3,611 registered public mosques.⁸ The vice president, Jusuf Kalla, who is also the Head of Indonesia's Council of Mosques, mentioned that the number of mosques in Indonesia was around 800 thousand⁹ - an extraordinary number with a tremendous potential to develop the Indonesian Muslim specifically and Indonesia in general.

While before mosques used to be managed by the leaders of community or the state, now they are self-managed by community. Different mosque managerial styles or preferences especially in Indonesia have lessened the inclusivity of the mosques. Some mosques are managed by the community and very open while some look as if they belong to a certain group of people. Mosques such as village mosques, government mosque, state-own enterprise

6 Sidi Gazalba, *Masyarakat Islam: Pengantar Sosiologi dan Sosiografi*, (Jakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1976), p.150.

7 Shihab, *Wawasan al-Qur'an*, p.463.

8 <http://simas.kemenag.go.id/>, accessed in January 2019.

9 <https://nasional.tempo.co/read/1144964/cerita-jk-pamer-ke-raja-arab-saudi-jumlah-masjid-di-Indonesia>, accessed in January 2019.

mosque, and campus mosques are examples of mosques exclusive to certain areas. Some believe that the exclusivity of the mosques was due to the ideology/cult of the mosque managers and this exclusivity allows a certain degree of radicalism to infiltrate the mosques. Therefore, it is very important for us to maintain the mosques' moderatism.

B. THE INDICATORS OF RADICAL MOSQUES

Theodorson states that radicalism is an approach without compromise due to dissatisfaction on ongoing social and political issues and a desire to carry out fundamental and new changes, including leadership issue.¹⁰ Radicalism is also a form of dissatisfaction on the existing order and system and a desire to change them with new and comprehensive (radic) ones. Aside from that, this approach believes that it is the only correct approach and ignores others and therefore, results in irrational attitudes and justifies violence (in its approach).¹¹ The radicals possess a closed mentality so it is common for them to use violence to achieve their goals. The most extreme measure from the radicals is terrorism.¹²

Islamisme is tendency for the Muslims to put forward Islam as an ideology.¹³ A contemporary Islamisme cannot be separated from the challenges of globalism and modernity which exist in today's world. Efforts to implement Islamic traditions in the modern era make them sort and choose what comes from modern life but have different views in seeing modernity, its challenges and solutions.¹⁴ The radicals' efforts to implement Islamic traditions in this modern era prompt them to separate and select ideas that are originated from a modern life even though their views on modernity, challenges and solutions might be different.¹⁴ The meaning of this sentence is not clear. There are 5 ideological

10 M. Zaki Mubarak, *Geneologi Islam Radikal di Indonesia: Gerakan, Pemikiran, dan Prospek Demokrasi*, (Jakarta: LP3ES), p.53.

11 Horace M. Kallen, *Radicalism*, dalam Edwin RA Seligman, *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, Vol XIII-XIV, (New York: Macmillan Company, 1997), pp.51-54.

12 Barry Rubin, *Islamic Fundamentalism in Egyptian Politics*, New York: Palgrave, 2002, p.7.

13 William E Shepard, "Islam and Ideology: Towards A Typology" in *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol.19 (1987). pp.307-335

14 Ridwan Al-Makassary dan Ahmad Gaus AF (ed.), *Benih-benih Islam Radikal di Masjid: Studi Kasus Jakarta dan Solo*, (Jakarta: CSRC UIN Jakarta, 2010), pp.23-42.

issues put forward by the radicals¹⁵:

First, the government system which includes the *khilafah Islamiyah* and Islamic State versus democracy. In the issue of the government system, the radicals reject democracy, which they consider a western concept, and view the *khilafah* system as the best choice. They believe that *khilafah* system is built on three foundations: sovereignty is not at the hands of the people but based on *Sharia* (Islamic laws), people's power is represented by the caliph, and the caliph is mandated (by the people) to formulate *Sharia*-based laws.¹⁶ They also believe that Allah's laws are the limit of all political power while democracy allows humans to have an absolute authority.¹⁷

Our forefathers founded the Republic of Indonesia to unite a diversified Indonesian nation from Sabang until Merauke. Indonesia gives its citizens the freedom to practice their religions. If Indonesia changes its current republic system to the *khilafah* system or an Islamic state, it would mean that it no longer commits to the consensus made by the forefathers, which is the freedom to practice their religions.

Second, the implementation or the formalization of Islamic Sharia versus a democratic constitutional system. The implementation of Islamic Sharia means the implementation of Islamic laws, including the Islamic criminal laws. Although Indonesia is not an Islamic country, it allows the Muslims to practice their religion in the community. For example, Islamic religious courts are established by the government to allow Muslims to implement the Islamic laws. This law, however, does not apply to all citizens. Indonesia has national laws, including criminal laws, which are enforced to all citizens. The formalization of Islam Sharia may mean that non-Muslims will be marginalized and forced to obey the Islamic laws. This may disrupt the nation's harmony. The implementation of Islamic criminal laws may also deny the existence of national laws formulated based on the framework of democracy.

Third, jihad against the enemy of Islam. Jihad for the radicals means fighting for the enemies of Islam, which may be

15 Ibid, pp.23-42.

16 Taqiyuddin an-Nabhani, Peraturan Hidup dalam Islam, Bogor: PTI, 2003, pp.201-210

17 Ibid, pp.23-42.

the western countries or Islamic groups working with the West seeking to destroy Islam. Jihad also means the comprehensive enforcement of Islamic Sharia. Jihad is implemented in Indonesia since the radicals believe that Indonesia is *darul harbi* (a war zone). The moderates, however, think otherwise. To them, Jihad means *jihadunnafsi*, or jihad against desires. They also reject jihad as a physical war through the use of violence and terrorism.

Fourth, gender equality. The Muslims believe that the Prophet Muhammad placed women as an equal to men. The radicals, however, think that women's place is at home taking care and educating the children, as well as dedicating their lives to the family. Since family is very important, if women choose to do their activities outside of their homes, they will be influenced by the western cultures. This may in turn affect the moral of the family. The radicals clearly reject the leadership of women in public domains, including the seat of presidency since it is against Islamic teachings.¹⁸

Meanwhile, the moderates think that the issues of gender and sex need to be differentiated. Surah An-Nisa [4]: 34 does say that *arrijalu qowwamuna 'alannisa* (Men are the protectors of women). This surah however cannot be read on its own. The next verse explains the requirements, which is "... since Allah has granted them some advantages over another and since men spend some of their wealth".¹⁹ Leadership in this matter is not related to the gender, but the ability and qualification.

First, pluralism is a belief on diversity and plurality. The radical Islamists reject pluralism since it places all religions as equals. They also claim that other religions and other groups that do not share their views are infidels. The goal of pluralism is to build a positive view on plurality and tolerance, to avoid hate speeches, to respect minorities' rights and to respect the freedom of religions.²⁰ The moderates actively promote tolerance as an effort to maintain plurality while the radicals prefer to avoid and despise other religions or call other religions infidels.

18 Noorhaidi Hasan, *Laskar Jihad: Islam, Militansi, dan Pencarian Identitas di Indonesia Pasca Orde Baru*, Jakarta, LP3ES-KITLV Jakarta, 2008

19 Nasaruddin Umar, *Argumen Kesetaraan Jender Perspektif al-Qur'an*, Jakarta: Paramadina, 2001, pp.21-22, 150-151.

20 Ridwan Al-Makassary dan Ahmad Gaus AF (ed.), *Benih-benih Islam Radikal di Masjid: Studi Kasus Jakarta dan Solo*, (Jakarta: CSRC UIN Jakarta, 2010), pp.40-41.

To find out more about the level of radicalism practiced in a mosque, the researchers dug deeper into the perception of the Takmir or the mosque administrators, as well as the religious education and management practiced by the mosque. The researchers also believed that it was important for them to find out the potentials for the elements of radicalism to enter the mosque. For this purpose, they looked at the current management for the religious activities, funding, the selection criteria for the preachers, decision making processes, determination of religious education materials, the method for religious teaching, and the current state of religious education students. The mosque management becomes the key to see whether the mosque is moderate, has been infiltrated by radicalism, or is managed by the radical groups. Furthermore, to verify whether the mosque belongs to the moderates or radicals, the researchers looked at the content of the sermons, the existing information media in the mosque such as bulletin boards and the topics discussed in Islamic study groups.

C. MOSQUES AND THE CHALLENGE OF RADICALISM

A few studies on mosques have illustrated how the mosques were infiltrated by radicalism. Since the time of the Prophet until now, mosques have faced different challenges. In Indonesia, for example, the Jamaah Islamiyah (JI) group promotes *jihad* through mosques. One particular example was Imam Samudra and Jabir who met in Al-Furqon mosque in Kramat in an Islamic discussion group session and later on, Imam Samudra recruited him to be the member of Darul Islam.²¹

Propaganda of certain ideologies often happens in mosques. Even moderate groups such as Muhammadiyah and NU have been deceived by the radicals' activities in mosques.²² Often times, the radicals change the way religious rituals are performed since these rituals are not according to the rituals they practice and other times, they change the symbols in mosques since these symbols are not in line with the radical's belief. Furthermore,

21 Ken Ward, "Indonesian Terrorism: From Jihad to Dakwah" in Greag Feally dan Sally White (eds), *Expressing Islam, Religious Life, and Politics in Indonesia*, (Singapore: ISEAS, 2007), p.216.

22 Abdurrahman Wahid, ed., *Ilusi Negara Islam*, Jakarta: Desantra Utama Media, 2009, p.191.

since the members of these radical groups show dedication to the mosque such as coming to the mosque on time for prayers and contributing to the mosque's maintenance, the mosque's congregation often feels sympathetic towards them. Since they also like to involve their friends in the mosque's activities, the Takmir has no objection in including them and their friends in the mosque management. In time, the radicals are able to take control of the mosque management and decide who can or cannot give sermons in the mosque. Although this case did happen in Pati, this is also happening in mosques in other regions as well.²³ The next part will discuss the findings of the studies done by CSRC and P3M on mosques and the infiltration of radicalism in mosques.

a. The Study on Mosques by CSRC

The study conducted by Center for the Study of Religion and Culture (CSRC) of UIN Syarif Hidayatullah on mosques and the promotion of peace in Poso, Ambon, Ternate, and Papua revealed that grand mosques in each city played a vital role in promoting peace and preventing conflicts²⁴ even though this role was not optimized and short term. Mosques had not implemented systematic programs to promote peace in mosques and among the Muslims and still held on to their traditional roles which are a place of worship, to preserve the morals and the fight of the Muslims. Sadly, when reading the history of Islam taught in schools and history books, it is difficult to picture Islam as a religion that promotes peace.

However, Islam is a religion of *rahmatan lil-'alamin* (a blessing for the world), not of war. According to Irfan Amalee, Muhammad SAW only spent 10%, or 800 out of 8000 days, of his prophethood life to lead the Muslims' political life, either as the head of the military, legal matters and state²⁵, and spent 40% to perform his social roles which were as a prophet, a humanist, an investor, an investment manager, a shepherd, a merchant, and an educator. The rest of the 50% was spent to perform his personal roles which were a noble person, an intellectual, a father and a husband. This

23 *Ibid*, p.29

24 Ridwan Al-Makassary, Amelia Fauzia, and Irfan Abubakar, *Masjid dan Pembangunan Perdamaian*, (Jakarta: CSRC UIN Jakarta, 2010).

25 Irfan Amalee, Komikirfan, <https://www.instagram.com/p/BqZimb9Bhsa/>, accessed in January 2019.

means that his missions were more to materialize a more peaceful Islam.

The conflicts should have forced grand mosques to take the role of a house for the Muslims. They should have become a medium to unify these heterogenic people to guard them against the infiltration of radicalism. Although grand mosques were supposed to be moderate, they were not able to implement this fully. During conflicts, the presence of the Jihad Soldiers in Ambon, for example, was considered a part of the conflict's negotiation.²⁶ Although in time of peace the moderates took back the control of the grand mosques' management, the mosques still accommodated radicalism. For example, the Salafi group members still became the teachers in after-school Islamic schools in Ambon or the Salafi Wahabi became the tutors of Islamic study groups in Poso. A study conducted by CSRC UIN Jakarta, which mapped the ideology of mosques in Jakarta areas, found that 21% of the mosque's Takmirs agreed that it is their obligation to establish the Islamic State and 32% said that it is their obligation to fight for *khilafah* (the caliphate system). Meanwhile, 89% agreed that Pancasila and the 1945 constitution as the best model and 78% believed that democracy is the best government system.²⁷

In relation to the Islamic Sharia, 14% of the Takmirs agreed that they need to fight the government that does not implement Islamic Sharia and 31% agreed that Indonesia must implement the Islamic criminal laws. 74%, however, disagreed that the most important jihad is war and 89% believed that *amar ma'ruf nahi munkar* may not be enforced with violence. The latest data revealed that even though radicalism had somehow influenced the Takmirs in Jakarta, they still disapproved violence to enforce *amar ma'ruf*. This is a good sign since these Takmirs still made efforts to preserve the moderatism. In the meantime, the existing potential for radicalism needs to be managed so that it does not become stronger.

In terms of mosque management, 59% of the Takmirs were not involved in the selection of discussion topics although 93%

26 Ridwan Al-Makassary, Amelia Fauzia, dan Irfan Abubakar, *Masjid dan Pembangunan Perdamaian*, (Jakarta: CSRC UIN Jakarta, 2010), p.34.

27 Ridwan Al-Makassary and Ahmad Gaus AF (ed.), *Benih-benih Islam Radikal di Masjid: Studi Kasus Jakarta dan Solo*, (Jakarta: CSRC UIN Jakarta, 2010), p.91.

said that they oversaw the topics. Generally, 88.4% of the Takmirs conducted open discussions, 11.2% conducted closed ones, while 0.4% did not know.

The finding above confirms that mosques are a potential ground for radicalism since the Takmirs are not involved in the selection of topics and some mosques allow closed discussions.

A study conducted in mosques in Solo found that generally, mosques are moderate and have an open and transparent management.²⁸ However, radicalism can still infiltrate certain aspects of the mosques. Exclusive mosques, such as Gumuk Mangkubumen Solo Mosque, do not allow general public to enter and to hold discussions inside the mosques. From the 'uniform' that they wear, it can be clearly seen that this mosque is managed by FPIS activists and when the researchers asked for an interview, the congregation refused since they claimed that the imam had represented them.²⁹ This exclusivity may allow radicalism to infiltrate.

Most moderate mosques are affiliated with Muhammadiyah and NU and they have created a mechanism which allow them to control and manage their mosques closely. One type of control is determination, including supervision, of Imam and khatib by the Takmir. In practice, however, although strict rules have been enforced, attempts to infiltrate these mosques can still be seen. Kottabarat Mosque, for example, is a Muhammadiyah mosque and a group of high school students, without the presence of the Takmir, use this mosque as a place for informal *halaqah* in the afternoon. During afternoon prayer time, a stranger might pray in the mosque and becomes an impromptu imam of the prayer. This stranger might ask the male students to lift their pants higher (*isbal*), a custom which is not practiced by Muhammadiyah.³⁰

Studies in mosques conducted by CSRC UIN in a few cities post conflict or in cities with a potential for conflicts in Jakarta also revealed the same result: most mosques are moderate with a potential of radicalism to infiltrate. While active infiltration in

28 Ridwan Al-Makassary and Ahmad Gaus AF (ed.), *Benih-benih Islam Radikal di Masjid: Studi Kasus Jakarta dan Solo*, (Jakarta: CSRC UIN Jakarta, 2010), p.91.

29 Rita Pranawati, *Masjid Muhammadiyah Kottabarat: Tantangan Gerakan Islam Moderat*, in Ridwan Al-Makassary and Ahmad Gaus AF, p. 121.

30 Benni Setiawan, *Masjid Al-Islam Gumuk Mangkubumen, Basis Eksklusivisme Islam*, in Ridwan Al-Makassary and Ahmad Gaus AF, pp.257-259.

mosques can be seen in Poso and Ambon, in Jakarta, this activity can only be seen in a small number of exclusive Islamic studies.

The Takmirs may become the key to the mosque management. They should control the mosque's activities, determine the preachers, the topics for the sermons, and Islamic classes' curricula, and supervise the education practices and rituals in mosques. To prevent radicalism, mosques need to be managed systematically and the functions of the mosques and their Takmirs become really important.

b. The Study on Mosques by LP3M


Based on a study conducted by *Lembaga Perhimpunan Pengembangan Pesantren dan Masyarakat (LP3M)* on 100 mosques: 35 mosques in the ministries; 28 mosques in government institutions; and 37 mosques in state-owned enterprises, 41 mosques were indicated to have been influenced by radicalism.³¹ This study collected its data from Friday's sermons, bulletin boards, wall magazines, and calendars.

This study found that 53.44% of the mosques had low level of radicalism, 27.22% had moderate and 42.34% had a high level of radicalism. The topics that contain the elements of radicalism were hate speech (73.6%), hatred towards the minorities (21%), a negative view towards other religions (21.17%), a positive view towards the caliphate system (18.15%), a negative view towards the minorities (7.6%) and a negative view of women leadership (1.1%). Furthermore, 64% mosques in state-owned enterprises and 36% mosques in the ministries were found to have held a positive view the caliphate system.

The map of radicalism in mosques can be seen below:

31 P3M, "Studi Terhadap 100 Masjid Kementrian, Lembaga, dan BUMN", power point, Jakarta, 2018.


Graph 1
The Map of Radicalism in Mosques



The graph above shows that that State-Owned Enterprise mosques are the most vulnerable to radicalism (57%) followed with the ministry mosque (29%).

Based on the level and on the number of mosques in each category³², government institutions have the highest level of radicalism (75%) followed with the State-Owned Enterprise and the ministries with each 33%. Meanwhile, State-Owned Enterprise have the most mosques with high level radicalism (62%). Although the government institution mosques have the lowest level of radicalism (42%), they have the most intensity for radicalism (75%). In the ministry mosques, the differences among the levels of radicalism are not wide with 25%, 33%, and 42%.

Graph 2
The Level of Radicalism in Mosques



³² The mosque category based on the level: 21 State-Owned Enterprise mosques, 12 ministry mosques, and 8 institution mosques.

From the graph above, it can be seen that mosques managed by government institutions are the most vulnerable towards radicalism even though their management is supposed to be under the control of the state. State-Owned Enterprises, which are under different government ministries, are also vulnerable against radicalism. Being under the control of the government does not guarantee that the mosques are free from radicalism.

Radicalism seen in these government mosques suggests that there are underlying issues of management within the mosques. Are the Takmirs radical? Is their budget limited so that they don't have any control on sermons, selection of khatibs and religious education there? Does the leadership pay any attention on them? It does not look good on the government if the government ministries, institutions, and SOE preach negative contents. The study itself revealed that 64% of SOE mosques and 36% of ministry mosques discussed the caliphate system topic.

This topic was even repeated 18 times in 11 mosques in the ministries, government institutions and SOEs. As government apparatus, they must show their love and devotion to the Republic of Indonesia and HTI, a religious organization that promotes the establishment of the caliphate system, has been banned by the government based on Law Number 2 Year 2017 on Mass Organization. Preaching a pro-caliphate content is an outright violation of the law.

One of the most popular topics related to radicalism discussed in these mosques was hate speeches. As government mosques, these mosques should not promote any negative views towards minorities and other religions or a positive view towards the establishment of the caliphate system. Islam discourages hate speeches since they lead to conflicts. Another topic that was discussed in these mosques was women leadership.

Looking at the facts above, the mosques in the ministries, government institutions, and State-Owned Enterprises need to restructure their management. These mosques also need to increase their capacity by providing the 'correct' religious education curricula and sermons, by being selecting their preachers more carefully and by taking more control over these mosques. The National Intelligent Body is now beginning to get

more involved in preachers' education for these mosques.³³

D. MOSQUES AND THE NATIONHOOD RESPONSIBILITY

When looking at how radicalism influences mosques and Takmirs, there are two points that they need to remember. One, nationalism and Islamism do not contradict each other, and the Republic of Indonesia is the form that was selected for the nation. Second, all Indonesian citizens must prioritize the national interests and peace. Since many Takmirs and preachers often neglect these two important points when performing their duties, their thoughts, attitudes and actions deviate from the visions and missions of the mosque.

In regard to the issues of nationalism and Islamism, all Indonesian Muslims possess two important identities: they are Muslims and Indonesians. Before independence, many groups and prominent national figures emphasized that Indonesia was a Muslim country since it was stated in the Jakarta Charta that Indonesia is "A religious country with an obligation to carry out the Islamic sharia for its believers." When independence was proclaimed, two groups - the secularists and the Islam nationalists - put forward their own ideologies to respond to the Charta. Eventually, Soekarno, through the Presidential Decree on 5 July 1959, re-stated his commitment to the 1945 Constitution and Pancasila and the people of Indonesia became the citizens of the Unified Republic of Indonesia regardless their religions, tribes, languages, and cultures.³⁴

Uncertainty often occurs when people become aware that there are new thoughts or knowledge that collide with their religious or national identity that they have had their whole life or have gotten to know better in their adulthood. This awareness often appears alongside the realization that Islamic laws must be upheld, that Islamic laws are the only source of laws and that they must make maximum efforts to practice Islam in their day-to-day life. If not, their Islam is not perfect.

33 "BIN Bina 50 Lebih Dai Terkait 41 Masjid Terpapar Radikalisme", Koran Tempo Online, 20 November 2018, <https://nasional.tempo.co/read/1148119/bin-bina-50-lebih-dai-terkait-41-masjid-terpapar-radikalisme/full&view=ok>, accessed in January 2019.

34 Ridwan Al-Makassary and Ahmad Gaus AF (ed.), *Benih-benih Islam Radikal di Masjid: Studi Kasus Jakarta dan Solo*, (Jakarta: CSRC UIN Jakarta, 2010), p.29

The facts above make people realize that the Islam that they have been practicing all their life is not entirely according to the teachings of Islam. This realization may lead them to radicalism. However, we need to understand that aside from the Muslim identity, we also have another important identity – Indonesian. The second identity, however, is not as applicable as the first one since it is more normative and quite invisible. Therefore, the Islamic doctrines may appear stronger than the nationalism doctrines.

This uncertainty does not need to happen because Islam came to Indonesia as a blessing to the all nations. Islam teaches us to love our nation or *hubbul wathon minal iman* and the love for our country is a part of our faith in Allah. The first pillar of the nation, which is “There is Only One God”, acknowledges a diversity in Indonesia. Indonesia Muslims are allowed to practice their rituals without any objections. The government even facilitates the Muslims. They are allowed to marry, to divide their inheritance, and to get a divorce in an Islamic way. What about the implementation of Sharia laws in Indonesia? The scholars had a very flexible view on Islamic criminal laws. Imam Syafi’i believes that the death penalty or *qishash* for murderers is optional and depends on the family of the victim. Imam Hanafi states the same thing about hand-cutting punishment for thieves. Muhammad Syahrur, a law expert from Syria, states that the Islamic criminal laws are the maximum punishment, but lighter punishment may be given to the perpetrators.³⁵

Muhammadiyah’s and Nahdatul Ulama’s commitment to guarding the Republic is a proof that the Islam moderate groups do not contradict Islamism and nationalism. A Muslim who lives in Indonesia must practice his/her religion and at the same time, guard the vision of a *rahmatan lil-’alamin* Islam.

The Republic of Indonesia, a consensus made by all people in Indonesia, must be guarded by all citizens, including the Takmirs and preachers. They must stop all religious cults and ideologies which wish to replace the Republic and stop all forms of radicalism. If they support the efforts to replace the Republic with the caliphate system or an Islamic State, they will support the effort to diminish Indonesia.

35 Ridwan Al-Makassary and Ahmad Gaus AF (ed.), *Benih-benih Islam Radikal di Masjid: Studi Kasus Jakarta dan Solo*, (Jakarta: CSRC UIN Jakarta, 2010), p.27

All parties, including the Takmirs and preachers, have the obligation to put the nation's and the country's priorities on top of their own or their group. Unity is the foundation for the nation to build and progress. If the Takmirs and preachers are able to do this by not spreading hates towards or discriminating against other groups, we will become a peaceful nation and will be away from intolerance, which is the root of radicalism.

Islam came to this country in peace and this can be seen in the meaning of the word Islam itself which is *dien as-salaam*, a peaceful religion. Therefore, it should be the visions and missions of the Takmirs and preachers to maintain peace. Peace can mean the efforts to prevent division among the Muslims internally or among religions. The contents of the sermons and religious education in mosques should remain moderate to maintain its peaceful mission. Peace does not mean the Muslims have no problem, but the Muslims are able to solve conflicts well.

In this digital era, it is important that the Takmirs and preachers ask their congregation not to make truth claims based on their own assumptions. People using truth claims often refuse to listen or accept other people's opinions. This is, of course, not the openness expected from the Muslims who are encouraged to spread the words of Islam in good ways (*mauidhoh hasanah*) and to argue in good ways (*wajadilhum billati hiya ahsan*). The Takmirs and preachers need to teach their congregation to promote peace as taught by Islam.

Islam introduces the process of *tabayyun* to gain accurate information and to seek good solutions. Islam encourages all parties to hold discussions to reach a peaceful solution. Muslims should quickly judge when they hear new information. They also need to refrain themselves from giving hate speeches. Therefore, sermons that promote peace will aid the efforts to prevent intolerance and radicalism.

E. THE IMPROVEMENT OF MOSQUE MANAGEMENT

The Takmirs and preachers have a large control over the missionary work in mosques. The Islam missionary works and its progress at the grassroot level is determined by how the Takmirs and the preachers run the mosques. They are in control over the tranquility and peace among the community. Therefore, they

need to have correct attitudes and a clear direction towards the mosque management.

Quantitatively, Indonesia has a large number of mosques and when used well, this potential may not only progress the country, but also prevent radicalism. All mosques – both community and government mosques - need to be managed well and should not be managed traditionally. Many choose to be Takmirs simply because of a calling, not professionalism when in fact, the job of a Takmir requires skills since it faces a lot of challenges and complexity due to the technological advances.

Based on the qualitative and quantitative studies on mosques and their potential for radicalism, to maintain moderatism and to prevent radicalism, we need to pay attention to these following aspects:

a. Mosque Leadership

Mosques need a leadership committed to its management. The position of Takmirs is not a social one but requires devotion and time. Without this, radicalism can easily seep in. Takmirs need to be committed to the visions and missions of the moderate mosque and of Islam as a *rahmatan lil alamin* religion. Without sound knowledge, the Takmirs will not be able to select the correct ideology and preachers when providing religious education to their congregation.

Aside from that, the leadership needs to establish clear rules, both in authorities and in serving terms, to be transparent to the community by producing periodical reports. Transparency in mosque management is important to increase community participation and to build trust between the mosque and the community. The transparency also means that the mosque does not belong only to a group of people, but all Muslims. However, this does not mean that all Muslims can be khatibs or preachers in the mosque. People who do not share the mosque's ideology cannot be the khatibs or preachers and the Takmirs should have the control over this matter.

b. Mosque management

Mosques with moderate visions and missions allow them to bring benefits to the community and to materialize a *rahmatan*

lil-'alamin Islam. For this purpose, mosques need to translate these moderate vision and missions into technical day-to-day implementation such as determination of the mosque's supporting system, management, religious education curricula and activities, as well as the people who are in charge of religious education and activities.

Each mosque needs to have a person, who is always on standby in the mosque, in charge of day-to-day implementation. This person should not only in charge of cleanliness, for example, but also can represent the Takmir during prayer times or other activities. If he possesses an ideology which is other than moderate, he may perform rituals which are not in line with the mission of the mosque when this person takes the role of the *Takmir*, *imam*, or *khatib*.

The Takmir is generally in charge of the mosque management, but it is important for the Takmir to create a more structured management in his effort to gain more control of the mosque by appointing a person in charge of each sub activity such as one person in charge of cleanliness and another for the selection of imam, khatib and the preacher. All these can be done to prevent the elements of radicalism to enter the mosque's activities.

The mosques also need to prepare religious education curricula and activities through sermons and discussion groups. They also need to select information that goes into the mosques such as news in bulletin boards. They need to select which contents can be displayed or not since they need to ensure that the contents are in line with the mosque's missions.

In practice, most mosques do not have any specific contents for their religious education. They leave it to the khatibs to select the contents of the sermons when in fact, there are so many contents, albeit not all suitable, can be selected by the khatibs such as khilafah, jihad, and the establishment of the Islamic state. When the mosques are selective with their curricula for religious education, they select the right content for their congregation. With this, they may prevent hoaxes, maintain peace, and encourage their congregation to become good and tolerant citizens. All these need to be done since the contents that the mosques provide today, which are *ibadah mahdah*, *aqidah* and *akhlak*, are still not able to tackle the issue of radicalism.

In relation of the religious teaching activities, the Takmir may provide activities that support the efforts to empower the congregation and to create a friendly Islam. Religious education can be provided for people all ages starting from adults, teenagers and children and it can also be provided for both males and females. For teenagers, for example, the lessons can be made more interesting to cater to their needs and era by holding a peace camp that teaches a peaceful Islam. Aside from that, discussion groups can also be developed. Is it going to be one directional or bidirectional? All these creative activities can be used to increase the congregation's knowledge and at the same time, to tackle radicalism and to promote moderatism.

The programs held in mosques should not be restricted to worship and religious education since mosques have an obligation to serve the community. Mosques need to hold programs that are able to empower the community such as healthcare, entrepreneurship, and social security. These programs may prevent radicalism since they improve the community's welfare. A few mosques have made the efforts to run the mosques independently by providing work and managing their own finance.

The mosque and the Takmir need to determine the criteria for the selection of *imam*, *khatib*, preachers, and other people supporting mosque's activities such as the teachers for the after-school programs. These criteria are important to maintain the mosque's moderatism and the mosque may become the medium for the teaching of moderate Islam for its congregation. Without these criteria, the chance of radicalism to seep in becomes larger.

In terms of financial management, the mosque must prioritize transparency. The mosque's bank account must not belong to an individual since the account consists of public fund. The mosque needs to prepare periodical reports on funds derived from the congregation such as ZIS (*zakat, infak, sedekah*) and spent by the mosque so that the mosque may ensure that it does not receive funds from groups carrying a certain ideology and the mosque are able to maintain the trust given by the congregation.

c. The Mosque Management Control System

The Takmirs are fully responsible for the day-to-day running of the mosque to ensure that the mission of Islam as a blessing

of the world can be realized. They need to be well informed of all activities inside the mosque, the people inside it, the contents of the sermons, the implementation of the sermons, and discussion groups' activities. The Takmirs need to know all activities in the mosque, especially those conducted by outsiders to prevent the infiltration of radicalism. The Takmirs also need to control the *imam*, *khatib*, preachers, until the teachers for after-school programs in order to keep the mosque moderate. If there is any indication that what they preach/teach deviates from the principles of moderate Islam, the Takmirs must know, clarify, warn, and even replace them. The content of the sermons or teaching materials must also be free from radicalism, violence and division. The Takmirs will be the last fort that guards the mosque against radicalism.

F. CLOSING

Mosques will always be the reflection on the conditions and the circumstances of the Muslim community. They have important roles in the nation's development because they are not only a place to pray but a place for education, religious teaching and empowerment. These important roles allow the mosques to empower grassroot Muslims since they are large in number and they are spread across the nation. Mosque's roles, however, are more than just related to the internal mosque's affairs and the Muslim's affairs. Mosques are important to guard the unity of the Republic of Indonesia. This vital role needs to be managed well through a good mosque leadership, management and control system. If mosques are run with full commitment and an awareness of its many roles, the Islam, which will bring blessings to the universe, will be materialized. When radicalism begins to seep into mosques, the *Takmir* and the mosque administrators will be the last fort that guards the congregation.

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His intellectual interest is fairly extensive. It is seen from the works and diverse activities. His academic work, among others *Records of Resistance* (2000), *Ahmad Wahib, Doctrine and Struggle Social Reality* (2004), *Waitress Children Learn to Serve* (2008), *Tendensi Teks* (2009), *Jara Mbojo: Cultural Horses* (2011), and *Religious Pluralism: Dialogue Paradigm for Conflict Mediation and Da'wah* (2016), as well as several book chapters and journal articles. With the research team of the Center for the Study of Religion

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Irfan Abubakar, from 2010 to 2018 served as Director of the Center for the Study of Religion and Culture (CSRC) UIN Jakarta. A Lecturer The Faculty of Adab and Humanities of UIN Jakarta is an academic person with a broad scientific interest in humanities and social sciences studies. Completed program for Arabic Language and Literature IAIN Jakarta (1995), Irfan continued his studies at the Graduate School IAIN Jakarta and holds a Master in Islamic Studies at the same university (1999). In 2000 he took part in the joint research on Islam and Phenomenology at the Faculty of Arts, McGill University, Montreal, Canada.

After joining CSRC in 2003, Irfan was sent to study conflict resolution at AMAN's School of Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution in Bangkok, Thailand (2005). His interest in the conflict issues led him to take the Advance Course in Security Studies at APCSS, Honolulu, Hawaii (2015). This Gontor boarding school graduate has written and edited many books and training modules around a variety of themes, ranging from Philanthropy Islam, Islam and Peace, Conflict Resolution, Islam and Human Rights, to Islam and democracy. He also researches and writes several articles in the media about the Hate Speech issue. Thanks to his works in 2011 Irfan was named by the Indonesia Campus Magazine Campus (August, Vol. 5) as one of the 20 Indonesia's top academics (for the humanities) under the age 45 of years old. As a hate speech expert, in recent years Irfan Abubakar has been regularly asked to be a guest speaker at various seminars and training participated by POLRI officers. He can be contacted via email: irfanaab@yahoo.co.uk or irfan.abubakar@uinjkt.ac.id

Jajang Jahroni, is a senior researcher at the Center for Islamic Studies and Community (PPIM) UIN Jakarta. Born in Serang, Banten, on 12 June 1967. After completing his basic education in his village Cikande, he moved to Ciputat, went to school at Tsanawiyah Daar El Maghfirah. For the Aliyah level, he studied at the Buntet Islamic Boarding School Cirebon, West Java. In there, he loved nahwu science and had memorized Al iyah Ibn Malik by rote. In 1986, he enrolled in the Islamic History and Culture Department of IAIN Jakarta. In 1994, he continued his Masters at Leiden University and finished in 1999. At Leiden he began to become infatuated with social science primarily anthropology and sociology. In 2007, he received a Fulbright scholarship and obtained his doctorate at Boston University under the supervision of Prof. Robert W. Hefner. He wrote a dissertation on Reproduction Knowledge of the Salafi Post-Suharto. Now he is listed as a lecturer at the Faculty of Adab and Humanities of UIN Jakarta. He is usually assigned to teach anthropology courses religion, Islam and culture, and other similar courses. His interest is in the Transnational Islam movement, Islamic authority, and its relationship with the public area. His works were published in several journals including *Studia Islamika* published by PPIM UIN Jakarta. He also wrote for newspapers or magazines, still related to culture. Some of his books have been published. One of them is the *Salafi Radical Movement* (2004) published by Rajawali, Jakarta, and *Understanding Terrorism* (2016) published by Prenada, Jakarta. Right now, he is researching the behavior of Muslim entrepreneurs in Indonesia, Malaysia and the Netherlands. He is married to Rahmawati M. Sani and blessed with three children: Rifqi, Gabriel, and Rose. He can be contacted via: jajang.jahroni@uinjkt.ac.id.

M. Afthon Lubbi Nuriz, is a young researcher at CSR UIN Jakarta. Born on June 3, 1987 in Jatirokeh Village, Kec. Songgom, Kab. Brebes. He completed his education at Pondok Modern Darussalam Gontor in 2007. After serving in his alma mater as a lecturer, he continued his undergraduate studies at the Department of Islamic Communication Faculty of Da'wah of the Islamic University of Bandung. Currently, this researcher who is also a principal and takes care of santri at Almanar Azhari Islamic Boarding School, Limo, Depok is completing his thesis on the

concentration of Media and Islam in the Postgraduate program of UIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta. His works have been published in several online and offline media, such as the *Republika Daily* and *Gontor Magazine*.

Besides this book, he also contributed to the writing of several other books / modules, including titled *Peace Education at Islamic Boarding School with Islamic and Human Rights Perspectives* (2016), *Counter Narrative Extremist: Islamic Boarding School Voice for Peace and Tolerance* (2017), *Pesantren Peaceful Message* (2017), and *Religious Literacy book Takmir Masjid, Imam, and Khatib* (2018) published by CSRC in collaboration with PPIM UIN Jakarta. He was also involved as researchers and writers in a national survey of the effectiveness Socialization of the Four Pillars of National and State Life in collaboration with the Indonesian MPR Review Board in 2018. His great interest in understanding generation changes especially Muslim millennials was poured out in some National media and National private television as a source of public discussion and talk show. In addition, he also actively contributes in religious literacy training religious for khatib, preachers, and mosque takmir, as well as advocating for students from Jabodetabek about peace education in Islamic boarding schools with Islamic and human rights perspectives. The author can be contacted via email: afthonlubbinuriz@gmail.com.

Rita Pranawati, born in Kebumen 6 April 1977. She finished her master's degree in Interdisciplinary Islamic Studies (IIS), Postgraduate program of UIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta (2006) and her second master at Monash University Australia in the field of Sociology with an Australian Leadership Award (ALA) scholarship as well as the recipient of the Allison Sudrajat Award. She had been with CSRC Jakarta in the issue of democracy, human rights, Islamism, peace building, and women and children since 2006. She was actively involved in Religion and Human Rights trainings starting from making the beginner to advance level training modules for young Muslim leaders among Islamic boarding schools in 22 cities in Indonesia (2009-2013). The Alumni of Indonesia Australia Moslem Exchange Program (MEP) is also actively involved as a facilitator in the Pesantren for Peace (PFP) program for pesantren throughout Java from 2014-2016. She also

became a trainer for the Civil Service Police Unit (Satpol PP) on human rights and gender issues.

Rita also explored the issue of children and families when she was the head of the Nasyiatul Pusat Aisyiyah Center and joined the Muhamadiyah Children Center in Aceh. She also became a commissioner for the Indonesian Child Protection Commission (KPAI) since 2014-2017 and was re-elected as a commissioner for the 2017-2022 period. She became the commissioner of family and alternative care and right now she is the Deputy of the Central Leadership Social Services Assembly of Muhammadiyah and Coordinator of the Legislative-Socialization Division from the Central Council for Law and Human Rights of Aisyiyah. She is also a lecturer at the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Prof. University Dr.Hamka (UHAMKA). She can be reached via: pranawati_rita2000@yahoo.com.

ABOUT CSRC

Center for the Study of Religion and Culture/CSRC (Pusat Kajian Agama dan Budaya) is a research and research institution in the field of religious and socio-cultural, established based on the Rector's Decree of UIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta on April 28, 2006. This is a development of the cultural field at the Center Language and Culture (PBB UIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta, 1999-2006) due to the increasing demands for developing religious studies and research (especially Islam) in socio-cultural and political relations. The purpose is to know and understand what important roles can be contributed by religion to realize the community order that is just and prosperous, strong, democratic and peaceful.


The importance of this development can be seen from the increasing role and influence of religion in the public sphere. From day to day, religion is not only a conversation of various levels of society, at the national or international level, but also its influence is getting stronger in the public sphere, amid the swift currents of modernization and secularization.

One proof of the strengthening of religion in the public sphere is the growth of religious characterized identities, symbols, and social institutions. The expression of Islam must be recognized for establishing a strong place in public. However, Islam is not the only entity, there are also other entities that helped enliven the face of our public space. As a teaching, source of ethics, and inspiration for the formation of social institutions, Islam often appears in its

diverse expressions because it is practiced according to the multi-interpretation of Muslim communities in various backgrounds. Due to this variety, different interpretations and streams emerged; as a consequence, the teachings and values of this noble religion often practiced in a distinctive color and feel. Sometimes, it appears in various portraits of exclusivism, but not infrequently also present as a source of social ethics, an inspiration for the development of scientific knowledge and technology, mediators for social integration, as well as motivator for civil society socio-economic empowerment. Islam also influences the formation of social institutions, politics, economics, and education that are more or less contributed positively to national development. In this context, the presence

Islam in the public sphere does not need to be a concern. Otherwise, this kind of Ethics and religious ethos needs to be appreciated by society and supported by all parties, especially the government. The presence of CSRC aims to revitalize the role of religion in that particular context. Religion must be actualized in the form of ethics and ethos at the same time, in order to color the formation of a good and accountable system. In the future, a careful religious transformation is necessary to be done to answer the challenges faced by the people, which from day to day seems increasingly complex, in the middle of the swift wave of social change and globalization. Considering the flow of change takes place faster than the ability of the people to upgrade its capacity, then it needs the right strategy.

In accordance with its duties and roles, CSRC tries to contribute to the research, information and training sector and facilitates various initiatives that can encourage the strengthening of civil society through policy development (policy development) in the field of social religious and cultural. Hopefully, in the future, the Islamic institutions will be developed into centers of productivity of the people (production center), and not actually a social burden (social liability). Thus, it is hoped that Muslims can enhance their role in socio-cultural life and economy positively and constructively



We certainly do hope that mosques can optimize their role in shaping the character of society. Most mosque *takmirs* also express this hope. They generally consider mosques to be not just places of worship, but also ideal vehicles for educating religious literacy.

The burning questions remain: what on earth is religious literacy and how is it actually practiced in mosques? Several studies have found that religious literacy in mosques revolves around issues of worship, *aqidah* and morals. These themes are conveyed normatively by *ustadz* or *kiai* through sermons or lectures.

However, only few of them discuss socio-human themes from an Islamic perspective; such as development of science and technology, work ethic, nurturing reading habits, promotion of peace, conflict resolution, and so on. While most of these *ustadz* or *kiai* do accept the concept of *rahmatan lil-'alamin*, only a few of them have discussed its application in mosques.

This book examines religious literacy that takes place in mosques, the challenges that are faced by many mosques, and how they react to them. This book attempts to open a discourse on the possibility of building a new direction for religious literacy in our mosques.



Empowered lives.
Resilient nations.

