


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Buku Islamism and Dakwah in Indonesia

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


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Chapter 1

Dakwah, Modernity, and Contemporary Islamist Movements

1.1 Introduction

This chapter explains the significance of *dakwah* within the Islamic world, with particular focus on the modern period. I briefly explain how *dakwah* was performed by the Prophet Muhammad (7th Century) and by his successors in the classical (7th–13th Century) and medieval periods (14th–18th Century). These periods—as I mentioned earlier in Introduction—are especially important because they are regarded as the basis for the contemporary formulation of *dakwah* ideology, including for the Islamists. The eras of the Prophet and the Caliphs have provided sources of inspiration for Islamists because they see pure and true Islam as having existed during these eras. This exploration of the performance of *dakwah* will thus enable me to explore how its meaning has altered in the modern period, particularly among Islamists, including the *Tarbiyah* movement – an Islamist *dakwah* group that emerged at the beginning of the 1980s in Indonesia.

Islamist groups are regarded as the most prominent adherents of *dakwah* in both Muslim-majority and Muslim-minority countries. Modern Islamists, having a stronger commitment to *dakwah* than was the case historically, believe it necessary to be especially active (and even sometimes aggressive) in preaching and Islamising both the private and public domains. In this chapter I argue that although both private *dakwah* (which concerns the Islamisation of the self to create pious individuals) and public *dakwah* (which concerns the Islamisation of society to create a pious society) were performed in the era of the Prophet, as well as in the classical and medieval periods, these concepts, especially public *dakwah*, have different meanings and orientations for contemporary Islamist movements. This focus on public *dakwah* has resulted in large part from the disappointment

that Islamists have confronted regarding the relative absence of *shari'ah* (together with the lack of religious values) within the public sphere in the modern period.

In this chapter I begin by examining *dakwah* within Islamic history, before exploring the impact that modernity has had on the Muslim world and outlining three basic 'types' of Muslim response to the impact of globalised modernity. In the final two sections I will focus on the contemporary Islamist movement, with special reference to the MB in Egypt – a movement that (as we saw in the Introduction) has significantly influenced and shaped the Islamist *Tarbiyah* movement/the PKS in Indonesia.

1.2 *Dakwah* in the history of Islam

1.2.1 The early period of Islam

Dakwah is a noun that comes from the Arabic verb *da'a*, meaning 'to invite' or 'to call'. In a religious sense, it is the invitation addressed to humans by God and the Prophets to believe in the true religion of Islam: "God summons to the Abode of Peace" (Q 10:25).¹⁹ This Quranic verse invites humankind to live in accordance with the will of God or the sacred law. In Indonesia, a Muslim who conducts *dakwah* (*dakwah* in the Indonesian language) is commonly called a *da'i* (plural: *da'iat*) when he is a male preacher, or a *da'iyah* (plural: *da'iyat*) when female. A *da'i* or *da'iyah* is one who calls, who invites, or is a propagandist.

Islam is a faith in the monotheistic (*tawhid*) tradition, and the messages of Islam are 'universalist' – open to all people, regardless of ethnicity, nationality, and race (Mandaville, 2007:277). Islam's openness to people beyond Western Arabia is emphasised in texts such as the Quran (49:13) and the Hadith of the Prophet. *Dakwah* has been conducted under this monotheistic

¹⁹ All the monotheistic prophets' religions are considered part of Islam and each prophet conducted *dakwah* in various ways. The Prophet Muhammad's mission was to repeat and act as the final seal of the previous *dakwah* of the prophets that went before him.

and universalist outlook since the beginning of Muhammad's prophecy (610 CE),²⁰ which he used to invite his family and close friends to join Islam soon after receiving a revelation from God (Lapidus, 2002:21). However, the way in which the Prophet invited people to join Islam shifted during his lifetime. In the first three years following his initial revelations, he conducted *dakwah* covertly, and the scope of his audience was limited to his close family and friends (Lapidus, 2002:21). However, he began to publicly declare his prophetic message in the fourth year after his revelation (Rippin, 2005), visiting different tribes to introduce the messages of *dakwah* and to call on the people to join Islam more publicly, as seen in the *dakwah* he delivered during his *hajj* (pilgrimage) period, and to the people of Ta'if (Janson, 2003). The Prophet thus changed his approach to *dakwah* from its covert beginnings to its overt nature in His later prophecy. According to Lapidus (2002:22), this change in the *dakwah* approach arose because God instructed the Prophet to preach overtly and publicly, as revealed in the Quran.

The central focus of the *dakwah* message of the Prophet was *tawhid* (monotheism) (Lapidus, 2002; Poston, 1992), and social reforms such as the freeing of slaves and the protection of orphans. Some scholars see these as two separate aspects: the Meccan society's concept of God and the reformation of its society (cf. Hodgson 1974). However, I prefer to see social reform as the main message and monotheism as the theological foundation of its reformation agenda (cf. Reza Aslan 2006). The Prophet's message of social reform attracted the lower class members of Meccan society and, after conducting *dakwah* for around thirteen years in Mecca, most of his followers came from marginal tribes and oppressed social classes, including slaves (Aslan, 2006), with the Prophet only gradually calling for Meccan society to join this new religious group.

²⁰ According to Muslim tradition Muhammad was born in Mecca in 571 CE and was appointed as a Prophet in 610. For the history and life of the prophet Muhammad, amongst many others, see Haykal (1976) for instance.

However, the *dakwah* of the Prophet angered Meccan elites, who felt disturbed by his movement. For them, Islam represented a threat to their old religions and beliefs and, perhaps most crucially, to their economic and political dominance (see Poston, 1992). Their pre-Islamic religions had a significant link to both economics and politics, and the *dakwah* of the Prophet was a direct challenge to the social and economic order of the society (Janson, 2003). Engineer (1990) has also argued that the Prophet's *dakwah* changed the economic monopoly and political leadership of the elites of the Quraish.²¹

Even though the Prophet faced resistance from Meccan elites, many of whom came from his clan²² – the Banu Hashim – he insisted in continuing to deliver Islamic messages to the wider society (Janson, 2003). The resistance of those elites increased after the death of the Prophet's uncle, Abu Talib, who was the leader of the Banu Hashim clan and the key figure protecting the Prophet's *dakwah* movement from the Quraish elites. Abu Talib's position in the clan was taken by Abu Lahab who, unlike his predecessor, was hostile to the Prophet's movement, and thus the Prophet and his disciples became much more vulnerable after his uncle's death. Facing strong resistance in Mecca led the Prophet and his followers to look for other cities that would accept them and tolerate their beliefs. Medina was finally chosen, and they moved to the city in the thirteenth year of his prophecy (622 CE). He continued his *dakwah* to Medianan people for ten years (622-632) – the rest of his life.²³

There was less resistance from non-Muslim groups and individuals to the Prophet's *dakwah* in Medina than there was in

²¹ Mecca, at that time, was a trade and business centre, and the Quraishi economy was dependent on 'rites' which people performed in order to get a blessing, especially Arab traders visiting the *ka'ba* (a holy place where many idols for worship were placed). Disturbing the dominance of these 'rites' would affect the two other sides (economy and politics) (Haykal, 1976).

²² A clan is a smaller group of a tribe.

²³ Several tribes, such as the Aws and Khazraj, supported the Prophet's *dakwah*, and offered Medina as the centre for his *dakwah* movement (Haykal, 1976).

Mecca, and this enabled the Prophet to start to institutionalise the *dakwah* movement publicly through the establishment of mosques. Following his emigration (*hijrah*) from Mecca to Medina in 622, he established the first mosque, called the Quba mosque.²⁴ He then built other mosques in which Muslims could not only perform their prayers or other acts of worship (*ibadah*), but could also conduct and attend religious meetings. Moreover, as Islam had spread to several places outside Mecca and Medina, such as Yemen, the Prophet also sent trained teachers to these new Muslim communities. As Rippin (2005:42) states, Muhammad emerged as both a forceful religious and political leader in this period – Prophet and statesman. For instance, in addition to calling for salvation in the Friday sermons, the Prophet Muhammad also started to enunciate public policies and messages. According to Antoun (1989:186), attendance at his sermons at Friday prayer became a political as well as a religious obligation, since it marked the newly formed *umma* (community).

1.2.2 The classical period of Islam

The *dakwah* project of Islam continued after the death of Muhammad in 632 CE, and came to be led by his four companions, referred to as *al-Khulafa' ar-Rashidun* (the Rightly Guided Caliphs): Abu Bakr (ruled 632-634), Umar ibn al-Khattab (ruled 634-644), Usman ibn Affan (ruled 644-655), and Ali ibn Abi Talib (ruled 655-661) (Poston, 1992). Although the leadership of the Muslim community became a controversial issue after the death of Muhammad, these companions, in turn, replaced the Prophet's position as leader of the Muslim community.²⁵ This is why they were called Caliphs (*khalifa*),

²⁴ The Quba mosque is well known among Muslims as the first mosque in Islamic history, whose first stone was placed by the Prophet Muhammad soon after his arrival in Medina. The building of the mosque was later completed by the Prophet's companions. The mosque is mentioned in both the *Quran* (At-Tawba: 108) and the *Hadith* (Sahih Bukhari, 2:21:284 and 2:21:285).

²⁵ A group later known as Shi'a argued that fourth Caliph 'Ali was the rightful Caliph and must be appointed as the first leader after the

which means successors (though not, according to Muslim tradition, 'successors' in relation to prophet-hood, but in terms of political and religious leadership).

When the Prophet Muhammad died in 632 and Abu Bakr took over as the first Caliph of the community, "the Arab[s] controlled no territory outside Arabia" (Rippin, 2005:58), but under their leadership, they conquered other places outside the Arabic peninsula, including Iraq (in 633), Syria (in 634-638), Damascus, Palestine and Persia (in 638) and Egypt (in 639) (Rippin, 2005; Lapidus, 2002). However, this territorial expansion did not necessarily mean that non-Muslims were forced to convert to Islam. Many wars or military aggressions occurred under these Caliphs' leaderships, and most of them were successful (Poston, 1992) but conversion was not always a high priority in early times not least because of the taxes paid by non-Muslims and the fact that any emergent Islamic ideology was most likely associated with the Arabs (Rippin 2005).

The territorial expansions continued under the first two dynasties of Islam – the Umayyad caliphate (661-750) and the Abbasid caliphate (750-1258) – which ruled after 'the Rightly Guided Caliphs'. During both periods, the military expansion continued – into North Africa, Eastern Europe, Spain (Western Europe), and central Asia (Rippin, 2005). Scholars such as Lapidus (2002), Rippin (2005) and Poston (1992) regarded the caliphates after 'the Rightly Guided Caliphs' as dynasties because the transfer of leadership was primarily based on family ties.²⁶ In the period of the Abbasid dynasty especially, the intensity of military aggression decreased with the emergence of a cosmopolitan urban peace economy based on Baghdad and the spread of Islam mainly through transnational scholarly and Sufi networks (cf. Mandaville, 2007), but military expansion increased

death of Muhammad'. However, Abu Bakr was selected by a group of elders as the most qualified person to rule at that time (see Rippin 2005:58).

²⁶ It is worth noting that these two dynasties originated from the Quraish tribe. They were thus from the same tribe as the Prophet Muhammad, albeit from a different clan.

again under the Ottoman Fit to page the capital cities of the Umayyad and Abbasid caliphates, which were located in Damascus (Syria) and Baghdad (Iraq) respectively, the Ottoman caliphate's capital was centralised in Constantinople (Istanbul), which was the capital city of the Eastern Roman Empire and was near to Europe. The Ottoman caliphate conquered many Eastern and Western European states and, as a result, its territory extended, stretching from the Middle East, through Africa, Asia, and Europe.

Dakwah messages in these classical and medieval periods (632–1700) were more complex than those in the era of the Prophet. Muslims in this period were no longer dominated by members of lower class society, but came from the upper, middle, and lower classes and from a much wider range of ethnic groups (Poston, 1992). In these periods, although monotheism and social reform were still one of the concerns of Muslim *dakwah*, justifications for power expansion and political contestation also marked the *dakwah* rhetoric. The former motivation (power expansion) could be found among Islamic rulers, while the latter (political contestation) could be found among both rulers and other Islamic dynasties in Muslim societies such as the Abbasids.

The legitimation of power expansion can be seen in Islamic rulers' ideological claims that their aggressions aimed to liberate indigenous (local) people from the oppression of the Byzantine and Persian empires (Lapidus, 2002) – a position supported by Thomas Walker Arnold (1965). They stated that non-Muslim rulers must be offered a number of options before being attacked: 1) to convert to Islam or 2) if they rejected conversion, to pay a *jizyah* or tax to the Islamic authorities. Only 'if they refused both these choices would they be attacked by Muslim soldiers' (Janson, 2003:67). Thus *dakwah* was part of the ideology justifying the political expansion of the Caliphate's territory.

Political contestation within Islamic societies, both at the state and the grass roots levels, also influenced the development of the *dakwah* concept during this period. The Abbasids, for instance, oversaw a period of increasing equality among Muslims

of different origins with the faith open to all, and utilised this as part of their *dakwah* message. Appeals to principles of equality were used by the Abbasids 'to undermine the political authority of the Umayyad dynasty as the latter's more parochial policies privileged Arabs over other ethnicities, thus denying the universalising potential of Islam' (Janson, 2003:70).²⁷

In this classical period, however, the Caliphs did not dominate the development of *dakwah*. There were also *ulama*, or religious scholars, who became the agents of *dakwah*. *Ulama* is an Arabic word (sing. *Alim*), which refers to "a class of scholars with privileged access to texts, methods, and traditions of knowledge that create their capacity to speak authoritatively on religious issues" (Mandaville, 2007:307). These *ulama* engaged in preaching Islam to their societies, either as an official part of state institutions or outside of them contributing to an emerging Muslim civil society. According to Janson (2003), ordinary people preferred to obey *ulama* or religious scholars who were mostly outside the state's authority. Moreover, the Islamic views of the *ulama* were not monolithic, varying for instance between the five main schools of law in Islamic jurisprudence (*fiqh*) – Ja'fari, Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi'i, and Hanbali (Hodgson, 1974).

Sufis from a variety of networks or orders (*tariqa*, pl. *turuq*) were also concerned with the development of *dakwah* after the era of the Prophet. They were primarily (though never exclusively) interested in esoteric issues concerning religion, with a focus on purifying the soul away from secular or worldly affairs and building up pious individuals. Sufi orders such as the *Naqsabandiyya* and the *Qadiriyya* are associated with a traditional form of *dakwah*, and their religious authority is closely related to the leadership of charismatic Sufi *Shaykhs*, who dispense spiritual blessings and wisdom (*baraka*) (Mandaville,

²⁷ Similarly, the Shi'a conceptualised their *dakwah* in a way that enabled them to fight against both Umayyad and Abbasid political authority. The Shi'a developed the notion of *ahl al-bayt* (the family of the Prophet) as the most authoritative for being both a religious and a political leader (see Janson, 2003).

2007). Branches of the Sufi orders have spread Islam to many countries throughout the centuries (Mandaville, 2007).

In contrast to the early period of Islamic history, during which the main agent of *dakwah* was the prophet Muhammad, these classical and medieval periods had a range of *dakwah* practitioners who offered a variety of *dakwah* approaches for Muslims, including: 1) the caliphs, sultans, or kings, who held political power; 2) the travelling traditional *ulama* or religious experts and their students, who had religious training; and 3) the *Shaykhs* and followers of sufi *tariqahs*. It can therefore be seen that the development of *dakwah* throughout Islamic history was dominated by traditional forms of *dakwah*.²⁸

1.3 Muslims' responses to modernity and *dakwah* in the modern period

1.3.1 Modernity and its impact on the Muslim world

From the Sixteenth century through to the Nineteenth, European society gradually acquired and expanded its cultural, economic, and political supremacy (Lapidus, 2002). This growth was marked by the rise of the natural sciences, new technology which enabled industrial capitalism and new forms of communication (such as the printing press), as well as a new political stability. The structural transformations that Europe witnessed in these areas is often collectively known as 'modernity' (Lapidus, 2002).

The modern period was also the period during which Muslim supremacy declined as European economic and political strength increased (Lapidus, 2002). Thus the European conquest of Muslim lands also occurred in this period, with Britain, France, and the Netherlands having conquered and colonised numerous Muslim countries by the end of eighteenth century (Rippin, 2005). One by one, the Ottoman caliphate's territories were occupied, and the caliphate itself – which was the only remaining symbol of Muslim political supremacy – started to decline, with

²⁸ In this context, 'traditional forms of *dakwah*' means that practitioners are well-trained as traditional religious trainers or scholars.

its final collapse occurring in 1924 (Lapidus, 2002). The collapse of the Ottoman caliphate – 'the sick man of Europe' - was widely taken as the key symbol of Muslim political stagnation.

European colonisation pushed Muslims into an intense encounter with modernity. Napoleon Bonaparte's occupation of Egypt in 1799 not only brought French troops armed with guns, but also modern science, administration, and technology (Lapidus, 2002). Later, Egypt was colonised by the British, who built modern hospitals, schools, and scientific laboratories (Lapidus, 2002). Egypt's Muslim leaders and religious scholars were amazed by these European modern scientific developments, and these encounters made them realise how much Islamic countries had declined compared to European (non-Muslim) countries. Within this period, then, Muslims came to acknowledge the superiority of European society and the end of their own supremacy. They felt that the Europeans had left them too far behind in the fields of modern education, economics, politics, and military power, and this loss of power produced a deep psychological impact on Muslims.

Realising their 'backwardness', many Muslim leaders adopted modernity, particularly within the arena of politics. They built freedom movements which aspired to indigenous modern nation-states, often leaving the idea of the caliphate and other traditional Islamic political systems behind. Nation-state building began after World War I, and during this period, Muslim elites in countries such as Turkey, Egypt and Indonesia endeavoured to establish modern political and social systems (Lapidus, 2002). These modernisation programmes transformed the structures of political systems in Muslim societies, with Turkey, under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Attaturk, becoming the first Muslim country to reject the Islamic caliphate and become a modern, secular state (Lapidus, 2002). For Attaturk, to develop the state required Turkey to become westernised and Islam largely privatised (Lapidus, 2002), and such thinking led to similar modifications soon following in other Muslim states.

This 'modernisation' agenda challenged many Muslims' convictions, particularly those who disagreed with the

marginalisation of Islamic systems (Milton-Edwards, 2005). In the face of such challenges, many Muslims felt it necessary to defend Islam and to object to the adoption of secular concepts such as rationalism, parliamentary institutions, and the replacement of Islamic law with European law. Many regarded this reform as being incompatible with Islamic principles requiring Muslims to use *shari'ah* as the central source of Muslim social life, and saw it as removing Islam from Muslims' public lives. As a result, heated debate emerged during the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries among Muslims, concerning how best to respond to modernity.

1.3.2 Muslims' responses to modernity

Many scholars including Wiktorowicz (2006), Rippin (2005), Roy (2004), Kurzman (2002; 1998) and Rahman (1982) have come up with different but related typologies to classify Muslim responses to modernity. As Rippin (2005) points out, typologies are theoretical categories that can help to identify tendencies, but social realities can rarely be fitted neatly into one position or another. For the sake of simplicity, I will examine three basic types of Muslim response to modernity suggested by these scholars – the traditionalist; the modernist (and related secularist position); and the Islamist.

The first basic type of response is traditionalism. Traditionalists have historically been the main Islamic groups to be concerned with *dakwah* or preaching. In responding to modernity, 'they refer to the traditionally well-trained *ulama*, *sufis*, or other religious experts, maintaining a strong commitment to the religious beliefs and practices that they have inherited from the past' (Rippin, 2005:192). They believe in 'time-honoured' ways of gradually dealing with changes (Rippin, 2005), holding that the changes brought about by modernity should not ultimately unsettle the tradition of the past.

Their *dakwah* seeks to renew piety and assure the correct devotional practice of individual Muslims. Their *dakwah* encourages Muslims to observe the tenets of belief and practice. As with Sufi networks, this *dakwah* movement is rarely involved

overt political activities, but Mandaville (2007) is right to hold that although it considers itself to be apolitical, in renewing the religious consciousness of Muslims, its *dakwah* activities can nonetheless encourage the emergence of Islamist-related *dakwah* movements. An example of a traditionalist *dakwah* movement in Indonesia is the *Nahdhatul Ulama* (NU), which was established in 1926.

Whilst traditionalism represents maintaining the status quo in Islamic history, other ideal types, such as modernism, promote various changes. Modernists hold to the idea of going 'back to the sources' of Islam, but tend to produce radically modern interpretations of them (Rippin, 2005:195). In contrast to traditionalists, modernists do not view the authority of the past as being entirely fixed or binding and may question key notions such as revelation (Burgat, 2003, Hefner, 2005, Rippin, 2005). The modernists perceive the need to reinterpret Islam in light of contemporary needs because most parts of Islamic teaching insist of following the interpretations of classical and medieval *ama*.

Modernist Muslims argue that there is no necessary contradiction between modernity and Islam and that the two are in fact essentially compatible. They adopt modern and 'Western' values, such as equality, liberty, democracy, tolerance, and justice, viewing modern knowledge and the use of reason to be necessary for bringing vitality back to Islam. Jamaluddin al-Afghani (1838–1907 CE), Muhammad Abduh (1849–1905 CE), and Rashid Rida (1865–1935 CE), Indian scholars Sayyid Ahmad Khan (1817–1898 CE) and Muhammad Iqbal (1877–1938 CE) are considered amongst the most influential modernist Islamic figures (Rippin, 2005:195) although interestingly some can be seen as pointing forward to more Islamist approaches (Rahman, 1982).²⁹

For an account of the work and life of Jamaluddin al-Afghani and Muhammad Abduh, see Hourani (1983), Keddie (1972), Kedourie (1965, 1966, 1997), Kudsi-Zadeh (1971) and Milson (1968); and for an account of the work and life of Sayyid Ahmad Khan and Muhammad Iqbal, see Ashraf (1975), Malik (1980), Schimmel (1989), Sheikh (1972) and Troll (1978).

An example of a modernist *dakwah* movement in Indonesia is the Muhammadiyah, which was established in 1912.³⁰

The secularist type of Muslim response to modernity adopts a similar approach to the modernist one. Given that modernist and secularist Muslims stand together in a number of ways regarding modernity, I have not categorised secularism as a separate ideal type, but rather as being attached to the modernist one. However, most notably, Muslims who seek to privatise Islam are classified as secularists. For them, although Islam has a significant role to play in society, it should not be used either as a basis for a state or for state law. According to Rippin (2005), Albania exemplified this typology in the mid-twentieth as it replaced all Islamic values with modern ones. This also happened in Turkey under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Attaturk (1881–1938), who founded the Republic of Turkey in 1924. Turkey separated Islam from the state and public life entirely, with modern laws and modern education replacing Islamic law and Islamic traditional education. The Turkish government abolished *shari'ah* law, the practice of polygamy and Sufi orders, and closed traditional Islamic schools (*madrasahs*).

Both traditionalist and modernist/secularist points of views on responding to modernity are rejected by Islamism, which is characterised by its key ideology that 'Islam(ism) is the solution'. In this regard, Islam is not only seen as a religion, but also as a political ideology that should reformulate all aspects of society, including politics, economics, social life, the law, and so forth (Roy, 2004), with Islamists emphasising 'the absolute character of the source of authority of Islam; Quran and Sunna'

³⁰ The Muhammadiyah is recognised as a modernist or reformist movement. On the Muhammadiyah's reformism/modernism, see Federspiel 1970, Nakamura 1980, and Peacock 1978; on the Muhammadiyah's attitudes to Javanese culture, see Burhani 2005, Nakamura 1983. The Muhammadiyah is called modernist because it allowed its members to follow *ijtihad* (independent reasoning to interpret the Qur'an and the Sunna) and they were thus not restricted to following a certain school of thought. See www.muhammadiyah.or.id (Accessed and up-dated on 5 April 2017).

(Rippin, 2005:183,192). In contrast with traditionalists, modernists and secularists, Islamists tend to accept changes in a 'controlled' fashion (Rippin, 2005:183,192). They accept more restricted changes than modernists, and use the two authoritative sources of the Quran and the Sunna to accept or legitimate changes in the modern era.

Islamists have often responded to modernisation in a complex fashion by rejecting Westernisation but rooting certain aspects of modernity in the 'pure' Islam of the Quran and Sunna. Thus, Islamists have 'indigenised and Islamised' many concepts and structures from Western political sciences, including ideology, revolution, organisation, democracy, and political parties (Roy, 2004:447). Islamists use political actions to attempt to re-create a 'true' and 'pure' Islamic society utilising *shari'ah* (Islamic law) to govern the state as well as public life (Roy, 2004). The key message of their *dakwah* is that Islam should be strongly present not only in the private sphere, but in the public sphere as well. Islamists also believe that the state should aim to unite the *ummah* (global Muslim community), and that the *ummah* should not be restricted to a specific nation (Roy, 2004). Most Islamists have sought to establish political parties and have participated in democratic procedures such as general elections whilst trying to show that Islam represents the best form of 'democracy' (Nasr, 1996). Islamists have claimed that *shura* (consultation), as mentioned in the Qur'an and practiced by the Prophet Muhammad, is a principle of democracy in Islam, but have accepted democracy per se in order to support their goal of establishing an Islamic society.

Rippin (2005), Roy (2004) and Nasr (1996) consider Abul A'la Mawdudi (1903–1979), Hasan al-Banna (1906–1949) and Sayyid Qutb (1906–1966) to be amongst the earliest Islamist ideologues. They are founding fathers and intellectuals of Islamist *dakwah* movements, namely the MB in Egypt (c.1928) and the Jamaat-i Islami (JI) in Pakistan (c.1941).³¹ Through these *dakwah*

³¹ For key studies on the Pakistani Jama'at Islami and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and its key ideologues see, for instance, Nasr

organisations, the afore-mentioned Islamist figures advocated a more 'authentic' Islamic framework for Muslim society. Also, whilst Mawdudi and al-Banna believed that the use of persuasion and gradual changes was best suited for achieving Islamic goals, Qutb believed in the need for more radical change.

These three figures had a significant impact on Muslims worldwide, especially young educated Muslims in urban areas with secular educational backgrounds (Roy, 2004, Mandaville, 2007). The MB attracted Muslims in the Middle East especially, and some of their branches became prominent parties in the Sudan, Palestine and Tunisia. By contrast, the JI became more prevalent among South Asian Muslims, and their immigrant and diaspora communities in Pakistan, India, East Africa, the UK, and the Caribbean (Mandaville, 2007:283). However, the MB also attracted Muslims in Indonesia, and became the inspiration for an Islamist *dakwah* party, whilst the influence of the JI is not prevalent among Indonesian Muslims.

The Islamists' ideology is inspired by revivalist or 'fundamentalist' ideas.³² For the revivalist, there is only one ultimate source of Muslim authority – that found in the Quran and the Sunna. Revivalists believe that if Muslims return to 'pure' Islam, they will be able to restore the 'glory' of the past, and they thus reject Sufism, philosophy, and the use of rationality in interpreting the Quran and Sunna.³³

Revivalism has a long history in Islam and emerged before the modern period, for instance in the figures of Ibn Taymiyya (1263–1328) and Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703–1787) – the founder of the Saudi Wahhabi movement (Commins 2009). Thus, according to Rahman (1982), revivalist or fundamentalist movements can be divided into pre-modern and

the modern manifestations.³⁴ Nevertheless, both pre-modern and modern revivalist ideas focus on purifying Muslims from non-Islamic faiths and any innovations (*bid'a*) that have entered their religious practices, including local beliefs, customs, and superstitions. The spirit of purification among revivalists holds that the essence of 'true Islam' will be corrupted by these innovations.

Islamists have adopted and developed many ideas from revivalists, such as the emphasis on erasing popular or traditional Muslim beliefs and practices, which Islamists also consider to be contradictory to 'pure' Islam. The difference between the two movements is that the revivalists' focus on Islamising society through purifying faith and rites, while Islamists are not only interested in this spirit of purification, but also in Islamising the modern nation-state and the public sphere through 'active' *dakwah* and politics. Islamists regard politics as the crucial arena to occupy in order for Islamist leaders to create a more Islamic society and an Islamic public sphere.³⁵

(1996), Zollner (2009), Al-Hudaybi (1969), Mitchell (1993), Lia (1998), Kepel (1985) and Gilsenan (2000).

³² Islamists, as a consequence, are sometimes referred to as 'revivalists' or 'fundamentalists', with many scholars using these terms interchangeably.

³³ This is regarded by Rippin (2005) as one of the key points for distinguishing Islamists from modernists.

³⁴ Rahman (1982) mentions other characteristics of pre-modernism, namely a deep concern with the socio-moral degeneration of Muslim society and a call to carry out revivalist reforms through Jihad. Some pre-modern revivalist movements had a Sufi orientation.

³⁵ There is an important relationship too between Islamists and the politico-Salafists of Wictorowicz's (2006) typology (see also Wahid, 2014; Rasheed, 2007; Hasan, 2005). Wiktowicz divides Salafists into three factions: 'purists', 'politicos' and 'jihadis'. All observe strict monotheism, returning to the Qur'an and the Sunna, and following the examples of the *salafus shalih* (the pious ancestors i.e. companions (*Sahabah*), their followers (*Tabi'un*), and the follower's followers). The difference between these orientations lies in their strategies in promoting their ideas: 1) the purists: through peaceful means such as *dakwah* for purification and education but largely disengaged from politics and maintaining unconditional obedience to the ruler; 2) the politicos: who is engaged with politics but typically pursues this through peaceful political means (like reformist Islamism); and 3) the jihadis: who engages in physical struggle against the unbeliever (*kafir*) even if that is a Muslim ruler who does not apply Islamic laws (Wictorowicz, 2006:217).

The debate concerning Islam and modernity indicates that there is a range of ways in which Muslims have dealt with modernity. They differ in approaches regarding the extent to which modernity and its transformations should be accommodated. Most Muslims realise that Islam has been declining – in politics, economics, the military, and sciences – and for revivalists or Islamists, this decline has been caused by Muslims breaking with Islamic values and traditions. They view most Muslims as failing to practice the ‘true’ Islam revealed to the Prophet Muhammad, and contend that the best way to solve this problem is to return to living by the Qur’an and Sunna. By contrast, modernists consider conservatism as the key factor that led to Islam’s decline and hold that in order to develop Islamic civilisations, Muslims should adopt modern culture and the sciences.

1.4 The Islamist notion of ‘active’ *dakwah* in the modern period

Modernity’s reshaping of Muslims’ lives (see Section 1.3) led Islamists to worry about the decreasing role that Islam was playing in society and in the state. The modernisation undertaken by Muslim rulers brought a shift in Islamic worlds in terms of culture, social life, economics, and politics, including the marginalisation of the *shari’ah* court, the *ulama*’s role in society, and traditional Islamic schools (see Section 1.3).

Their worry about the absence of Islam in the public sphere led Islamists to become the front-line *dakwah* group, intensively countering the impact of modernisation in the Islamic world by seeking to speak their truth to power (Hirschkind 2006). Although, they use modern technologies such as transportation, telecommunications, and medical technology, the Islamists’ *dakwah* is especially active in countering Western culture, politics, and economics (Mandaville, 2007). Unlike modern technology, which they perceive to be ‘neutral’, Western culture, economics, and politics are regarded as reflecting ‘Western’ values, which are characterised as ‘atheistic’, secular, and anti-religion (Roy, 2004; 1994).

Islamism is the most ‘active’ Islamic *dakwah* movement in the modern period. Activism is the key identity of this globally diverse movement, which routinely calls on Muslims to respond to the impact of Western power. The ideas of criticising ‘Western’ modernity and emphasising Islamic identity are most attractive to urban, lower middle class Muslims (Burgat, 2003; Eickelman and Piscatori, 1996), who believe that modernisation programmes in Muslim countries cannot succeed in transforming these societies into prosperous ones. For them, religious authenticity is the key for this transformation (Rippin, 2005, Mandaville, 2007), and this is one of the central factors that generates their interest in the ‘alternative’ to the state system offered by Islamists (Hirschkind 2006). Their *dakwah*, as an activist ideology, therefore represents a new or reinvented approach.³⁶

Islamist *dakwah* movements see Islam as a comprehensive and active ideology whose role is not only to transform their selves but also their society. During the beginning of twentieth century, these *dakwah* movements emerged rapidly in countries such as Egypt and India where Islamic organisations such as the neo-Salafi movement, the mystical orders, and Islamic reformism were established (Meuleman, 2011). Examples of these groups include the MB, founded in Egypt in 1928 and the *Jama’ati Islami* (JI), founded in India in 1941. Their *dakwah* emphasises the promotion of Islamic teachings and the provision of information on Islam for both Muslims and non-Muslims (Mandaville, 2007:285).

These organisations propagate *dakwah* messages, not only focusing on private *dakwah* or seeking to Islamise

³⁶ I use the term ‘active’ or ‘activist’ *dakwah* in this book to reflect what I heard from daily conversations in Indonesia in referring to the *Tarbiyah* community and also to reflect what I inferred from the literature of Islamist movements. From this literature, I understood that Islamist groups are regarded as the most prominent practitioners of *dakwah*, believing it to be necessary to be active (and sometimes aggressive) in Islamising both the private and public domains (see Introduction).

individuals, but also focusing on public *dakwah* with the aim of Islamising the society and the state. For them, *dakwah* not only serves the purpose of educating people, but should also be used for correcting their religiosity and behaviour (Mahmood 2005). The focus of *dakwah*, for them, should go beyond the level of the individual, and be instrumental in creating an Islamic society, either through establishing Islamic political parties or producing impacts on the social and spiritual aspects of society through some other media or 'counterpublic' (Hirschkind 2006). Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the core *dakwah* agenda of these organisations is the same – to transform individual Muslims and their society based on Islamic teachings.

In transforming their societies, these organisations developed a variety of *dakwah* models, including religious edification, religious education or training, and Islamic charity or social activity, building educational centres, religious places, and social and public services such as hospitals and clinics to support their agenda. They also travelled to many countries around the world to promote their *dakwah* ideology and, as a result, transnational *dakwah* activities and *dakwah* organisations have been established in many parts of the Muslim world (Mandaville, 2007:283). These organisations have adopted various new forms of *dakwah*, with new aims based on their religious interpretations, their responses to public issues, and their involvement in social and political activities.

Key Islamist figures such as Hasan al-Banna, Sayyid Qutb, and Abul A'la Mawdudi have greatly influenced contemporary Islamist *dakwah* movements by strengthening their focus on locating Islamic identity within the public sphere and critiquing modernity. They also exemplify more 'gradualist' (al-Banna and Mawdudi) and more 'radical' / 'revolutionary' (Qutb) forms of Islamism. Al-Banna, the founder of the MB, was deeply concerned about the impact of Westernisation on the Islamic beliefs and practices of Egyptian Muslims, perceiving Western culture and thought to have had a significant influence on Muslims in Egypt (Mitchell, 1993). He regarded this influence as a cause of the moral and political decline of Muslims, and created

a new model of *dakwah* that called on Muslims to perform Islamic teachings in their daily life to address this, ranging from issues regarding domestic affairs to public matters. For al-Banna, Islam needed to provide the key guidance for Muslim societies, and his influence is clear in the MB's political views that Islam: 1) is a comprehensive, self-evolving system providing the ultimate path to life; 2) emanates from, and is based on, two fundamental sources – the Qur'an and the Sunna; and 3) is applicable at all times and places (Mitchell, 1993). However, although he, like other Islamists, promoted the establishment of a better Islamic state, he did not propose violence as a means for achieving this goal. The ideas of al-Banna regarding 'active' *dakwah* will be elaborated further in next section (Section 1.5).

Like al-Banna, Sayyid Qutb, who was born in 1906 in Asyut-Egypt and was hanged by Gamal Abd al-Nasser in 1966 for his denunciation of the Egyptian regime, also criticised modern cultures and thoughts.³⁷ These criticisms are mostly presented in his books, *al-Adala al-Ijtima'iyya fi al-Islam* (Social Justice in Islam) which was written in 1949 and *Ma'alim fi al-Tariq* (Milestones) which was first published in 1964. The first book explains that the separation of religion and politics is a characteristic of Western societies and thus would be inappropriate for Islamic societies. He argued that 'there is no hierarchy among believers and the ultimate authority lies with God alone and Islam is the basis for social equality and true justice' (Zollner, 2009:51). The second book deals with the key concept of *jahiliyya* (ignorance).³⁸ According to Qutb, although

³⁷ Qutb is well known as one of the leading figures of the MB. He became a member of this MB in 1951, then head of its department for spreading Islam (*Qism nashr al-dakwah*) in 1952, and an editor of the weekly newspaper *al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn* in 1954 (Zollner, 2009)

³⁸ Qutb, divided *jahiliyya* society, in which people are ignorant of divine guidance, into three types. First, there is Communist or Atheist society, which denies God, and in which sovereignty (*hakimiyya*) is exercised in the name of the people or parties; second there is Jewish and Christian society; and lastly there is contemporary Muslim society (Kepel, 2005:47). This book is considered to be the key text

current Muslim societies proclaim themselves to be Muslim, they do not practice worship (*ibadah*), and they erroneously believe in sovereignty (*hakimiyya*) other than God. For Qutb, Muslims in these societies are also living in *jahiliyya* (Kepel, 2005)³⁹ – they are living in the same condition as the Arabian people in the pre-Islamic *jahiliyya* before the Prophet Muhammad proselytised Islam.⁴⁰

According to Qutb, any society that is not Muslim is an instance of *jahiliyya* (Kepel, 2005:47), and everything outside Islam must also be included in the category of *Jahiliyya* as it is derived from the spirit of barbarism and is contrary to Islamic teachings (Rippin, 2005). For Qutb, although contemporary Muslim governments remain, they can be categorised as ‘infidel’ governments when they do not implement *shari’ah*. Muslim rulers, as they existed in the history of Islam are, therefore, not enough for Qutb and his followers: Muslim rulers must have a commitment to implementing *shari’ah* and Islamic values in their countries. A Muslim society, according to Qutb, must apply Islam across the board, letting it guide their faith, worship, legislation, social organisations and modes of behaviour.

As a result of these views, Qutb, unlike al-Banna, stated that Muslims are allowed to fight against such ‘infidel’ governments (Haddad, 1983). Qutb therefore promoted a new model of *dakwah* that emphasised the need for activism and political *jihād* in order to turn Islam into a global power (Zollner, 2009). This shows Qutb’s goal of making Islam the basis of a state – an orientation that demands a total human submission to God (Khatāb, 2006). Qutb thus rejected democracy, rationalism and secularism, and held that Islam needed to be purified from Western influences. For instance, he rejected the Western banking

for the *dakwah* ideology of radical Islamists (Zollner, 2009; Qutb, 1992; Kepel, 2005).

³⁹ Qutb’s critique of the modern *jahiliyya* “stems from his identification of Islam with the dynamic unity of the universe and his assertion of the autonomous character of human actions” (Lee, 1997:100).

⁴⁰ Qutb drew on Mawdudi for the terms and interpretations of *hakimiyya* and *jahiliyya* (see Zollner, 2009)

system, which he considered to be contrary to Islamic law. He also criticised Western behaviour, in particular that associated with a concern for material goods (Lee, 1997). Likewise, he rejected Western ideas about separating religious from secular matters, and the West’s adherence to rationalism. He thus refused to reconcile Islamic teachings with European outlooks, viewing Islam as a comprehensive ideology that regulates all aspects of human life (see Khatāb, 2006; Moussalli, 1992; Shepard, 1992).

Giles Kepel (2005), who studied Islamic radical movements in Egypt, found that many contemporary radical Islamist activists are influenced by Qutb’s ideas and, like Kepel, Rippin (2005) classified Qutb and other Muslims who oppose their governments as ‘radical’ Islamists. Qutb was also considered to be responsible for the shift in the outlook of at least some of the MB’s members from holding moderate views under al-Banna’s leadership to becoming a radical splinter movement. His concept of *Jahiliyya* marks an obvious fission in the MB’s ideology, as al-Banna never accused the Egyptian regime of his day of being non-Islamic (Kepel, 2005).

Mawdudi was another key Islamist figure. He was regarded as an Islamist because of his beliefs about God’s unique sovereignty, the universal application and implementation of *shari’ah*, and the need for a democratic caliphate (Nasr, 1996). According to Mawdudi, sovereignty over any aspect of life is only for God, since God is the creator and the ruler of the universe.⁴¹ He criticised the concept of democracy because he

⁴¹ Mawdudi elaborated his idea of sovereignty in his book, *First Principle of Islamic State*, published in 1960. Sovereignty is that which *de jure* belongs to Allah, and *de facto* is manifested in the working of all parts of the universe. Mawdudi refers to some verses of al-Qur’an (7:3, 12:40, 5:44) in which it is insisted that the acceptance of the *de jure* sovereignty of God is the meaning of Islam, while denying such sovereignty is *kufir* (unbelief). In other words, there is no space for any other sovereignty in the world, particularly in a state. The sovereignty can be defined as the source of power and law and, for Mawdudi, such a source is only found in God. Although people elect government representatives, sovereignty does not *come* from people.

believed that it mislead people about the true concept of sovereignty (Mawdudi, 1960). Furthermore, governments that are elected by people should consider their position as being *amanah* (in trust) from God. Therefore, they have to implement God's commands – *shari'ah* – in the state and in all Muslim society.

Appealing to such an understanding of sovereignty, Mawdudi argued that political sovereignty also belongs to God alone. If there are human agents that seek to constitute the sovereignty of God through implementing the political system of Islam in a state, they will never succeed because of the limitations of their power.⁴² A democratic caliphate, for Mawdudi, means that the government is the only institution that is responsible for establishing *shari'ah*. The Islamic caliphate is certainly not a 'theocratic' system. It is the antibook of monarchy, and fundamentally different from the Western democratic system, which is based on the sovereignty of the people, whereas the caliphate system is tied to the sovereignty of God.

1.5 The contemporary Islamist *dakwah* movement: the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt

To understand how contemporary Islamists apply their *dakwah* strategy, I will now examine the MB movement in Egypt in greater detail. The MB has been chosen because it has influenced the establishment and the development of the *Tarbiyah* movement of the PKS in Indonesia, the *dakwah* movement that I am focusing on in this book. Here, the MB is explored in terms of its strategy of utilising private *dakwah* to Islamise individuals, and the public and political use of *dakwah* to Islamise the public sphere. Founded in Ismailia in 1928 by Hasan al-Banna, the MB endeavoured to establish a greater religiosity among Egyptian Muslims. The MB hoped that it would be able make Egyptian society more Islamic through influencing individual outlooks, and

⁴² The agents are called 'caliphates', which means that they are not sovereigns in-themselves. Such agents are the representatives of the real sovereignty. The agents or systems they construct are under the sovereignty of God, who is the owner of the sovereignty both *de jure* and *de facto*.

concentrated its movement first on changing the attitudes of individuals, then families, and finally society (Mitchell, 1993, Gilsenan, 1982). This indicates that the MB started with individual *dakwah*, and then extended this to public *dakwah*.⁴³

Given that the aims this movement adopted were to reform individual and social morality, *Tarbiyah* (training, education) became the core 'indoctrination unit' that it employed (and continues to use) to achieve this objective (Mitchell, 1993:195). These *Tarbiyah* activities were (and continue to be) supported by the 'family' system (*nizam al-usra*), with each family system being composed of no more than ten active members, one of whom is chosen to be a leader or mentor representing a family (Mitchell, 1993:197). This family system conducts regular lectures and classes on Islamic teachings, which focus on building the commitment of each 'family' member. This *Tarbiyah* instrument is still the main *dakwah* activity and ideological link that MB branches worldwide share.

The MB's character and ideology in its early period was influenced by al-Banna's background as a teacher and follower of a traditionalist Sufi network (Mandaville, 2007:59). According to Gilsenan (1982), this Sufi background had an influence on the way in which al-Banna managed the MB movements in relation to individual piety. For al-Banna, education (*Tarbiyah*) represented the best approach for making the views and attitudes of Muslims more pious and disciplined. The movement was then called *Tarbiyah* (education), and its main activities were to educate adults and children through increasing their religious consciousness. In addition to the religious education that was chosen by al-Banna as a method for achieving the MB's ideals, worship activities (*ibadah*), such as the practice of *dhikr* (mentioning God's names and other recitations), were also used to establish religious awareness among members. In line with al-

⁴³ For further accounts of the *dakwah* strategy of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Indonesian language, see Hasan al-Banna (2001), *Risalah Pergerakan 2* and Ali Abdul Halim Mahmud (2004), *Perangkat-Perangkat Tarbiyah Ikhwanul Muslimin*. trans. Wahid Ahmadi et al. Both books are published in Solo, Intermedia.

Banna's revivalist views, the MB called on Muslims to return to the 'true' Islam of the Quran and the Prophet's traditions (*Sunnah*).

A part of the MB's focus on public *dakwah* was concerned with countering secular ideas from the West that had started to emerge in Egypt. As Gilsenan (1982) notes, external powers in the form of colonialism, Zionism and communism changed Egypt radically, and represented the major impetus that led to the MB's objective to change Egyptian society. The MB believed that a society based on 'true Islam' provided the best model for a modern Egyptian state, in contrast to the ideas of secular nationalism that were widely professed by Egyptian elites at that time. It is worth noting that the MB accepted nationalism, conceiving of it as an effective medium through which to fight against colonialism and imperialism in Egypt. However, the MB endeavoured to establish a form of nationalism based on Islamic morality. Moreover, the MB preferred to build Islamic social order within the framework of the modern nation state instead of through adopting an Islamic caliphate (Mandaville, 2007:60).

Nevertheless, the MB was not only concerned with colonialism, but also with cultural imperialism. The MB's leaders wanted to raise people's consciousness of materialism, individualism, atheism and democracy being the destructive forces that these great powers have unleashed on individuals and societies. Cultural imperialism, according to Hassan Al-Hudaybi (1891-1973), a key MB figure as leadership successor to al-Banna as "General Guide", "entered the minds of the people with its teachings and thoughts and tried to dominate [the] social situation in Egypt" (Gilsenan, 2000:229-230; Al-Hudaybi, 1969). For Qutb, this 'spiritual and mental invasion' presented the true danger to Muslims. As a result, the MB's active *dakwah* was designed to counter the impact of this cultural imperialism, and to raise Muslims' consciousness – something they thought that traditionalist Muslim leaders were failing to do.

The MB's ideology appeared in a context where the discourse concerning the necessity of reviving the caliphate (after its abolition by Mustafa Kemal Attaturk in Turkey in 1924) was

being pushed by Muslim leaders. Rashid Rida and Ali Abd al-Raziq (1888–1966) were the most prominent Egyptian Muslim intellectuals discussing this issue at the time (see Salvatore, 1997). For Rida, the caliphate is authorised by the Qur'an, and plays an important and central role in the history of Islamic society. Although Rida realised that it would be unrealistic to rejuvenate the caliphate due to the contemporary political conditions at that time, he emphasised the importance of *ulama* in providing guidance for a state, together with the establishment of Islamic social order (Mandaville, 2007:51-52). Abd al-Razik disagreed with this outlook, arguing that the Quran never takes a stand on the kind of state that Muslims should establish, and argued that the existence of the caliphate in Islamic society engendered repressive attitudes by the state towards its citizens (Mandaville, 2007:52). However, there is a strong case to be made that the MB was most concerned with shaping an Islamic social order through Islamising society, and that it was largely ambivalent about whether this was done within the structure of an Islamic caliphate or a modern secular nation state, so long as this primary goal could be achieved.

As Kepel (1985:26) has observed, although the MB in Egypt was "officially a social organization and not a political party, it represented the largest organised popular force in the country". Within a short period of time, the MB became a significant Islamic movement in the political constellation of Egypt, having 2,000 branches and half a million active members by the early 1930s (Mandaville, 2007:69). Perhaps most impressive is the fact that its supporters came from a considerable range of social milieus and professional sectors. Mitchell describes how "its membership became so diversified as to be virtually representative of every group in Egyptian society", from students and civil servants to urban labourers and peasants (1993:12). According to Gilsenan (1982:220), this wide social range of MB members was "an organizational and ideological response to, and a proffered resolution of their own and the collective crisis".

In its earlier incarnation, capturing political power at the state level was not one of the MB's goals, with al-Banna even prohibiting Muslims from establishing political parties (Mandaville, 2007:60). The MB required the state to play its role in Islamising society through such means as increasing the quantity and quality of religious education in schools and encouraging religious and spiritual behaviour within society (Mandaville, 2007:61). However, the repressive political system of the Egyptian government led the MB to shift their approach in Islamising society during the next periods of its development. During the middle to the end of the 1930s, 'the MB's political concerns began to increase' (Mitchell, 1993:9). Given that one of its objectives was to drive out colonialism, the MB began to take a more direct role in criticising the government and other political authorities in relation to British interference with the Egyptian government. As a result, the relation between the MB and the government became increasingly strained, and an eventual conflict was inevitable.

In the 1940s, the MB experienced suppression from the state, and some of MB's leaders were imprisoned (Mitchell, 1993). Moreover, the government was involved in preventing al-Banna from holding public office. He was asked by the government to withdraw his parliamentary candidacy, and his followers believed that the government had manipulated the polling process to cause al-Banna to lose in the election (Mandaville, 2007:72). It was undeniable that this strained relationship with the government encouraged the MB to become more critical of them and to lead protests against policies that ignored British intrusions in Egypt. On the other side, the government suspected that the MB was involved in several violent local attacks.⁴⁴ This combination of factors led the Egyptian government to finally ban the MB in Egypt in 1954 (Gilsenan, 1982:223).

⁴⁴ However, the MB countered 'this regime's charge of conspiracy by claiming that the attack had been a police provocation' (see Kepel, 1985:27).

For the MB, public *dakwah*, public affairs, and politics cannot be separated. Given their belief that *dakwah* permeates all aspects of a Muslim's life, 'the MB still operated even though the government had repressed the movement, and during the 1970s it began to transform its political movement' (El-Ghobashy, 2005:377). From this period on, the MB began to gradually exist again in the public life of Egypt (Mandaville, 2007:107). El-Ghobashy (2005:376) contends that the details of its establishment and its early history indicate that the MB has the capability to adapt to changing political situations. She points to evidence such as al-Banna's participation in the general elections of 1942 and 1945, observing that although the government had prevented him from being elected, the MB did not undertake any radical retaliation in response. It is worth noting that under the rule of Anwar Sadat (ruled 1970-1981), who succeeded Nasser, the MB had been given a space to re-enter the public sphere, but Sadat signalled that he would only welcome the "moderate" MB into the public life of Egypt. This led to a conflict within the MB, with the 'radicals' (a Qutb-influenced splinter group of the MB) accusing the 'moderate' figures of having been co-opted by the government. The divide between the radical wing and the moderate wing of the MB thus became sharper in this period.

However, the moderate wing, which was the mainstream of the MB movement, came to have an increasingly significant public role during the 1980s and 1990s (Kepel 2003; Mandaville 2007). It targeted social and professional organisations, such as student unions and councils, as mediums through which to plant its influence. It succeeded in taking over the engineering, pharmaceutical, and medical professional associations (Mandaville, 2007:110), and its activists undertook public welfare activities, such as providing aid to the victims of disasters. This social role, which is viewed as part of their *dakwah* strategy, attracted wider public popularity and sympathy from the Egyptian people.

Its increased popularity encouraged the MB to participate in the 1984 election, in which it established an alliance with the *al-Wafd* party (El-Ghobashy, 2005:378). This alliance secured

approximately 15% of the vote – around 58 seats. However, the MB was only given 8 seats, while *al-Wafd* obtained 48. This allocation was not beneficial for the MB since, while it was responsible for the political movement of the alliance, it only got few seats in parliament. Thus, in the following election in 1987, the MB instead built an alliance with the Labour party and the *Ahror* (Liberation) party. This alliance obtained 17% of the national vote, and 56 seats, with the MB receiving 36 of these seats (El-Ghobashy, 2005:379).

The MB's engagement in politics caused a shift in its ideological orientation. An indication of this was seen when the MB reinterpreted verses relating to gender equality and women's roles in public spaces (El-Ghobashy, 2005:382). Moreover, the MB movement also began to give higher priority to political issues relating to freedom, democracy, culture, education, and the economy, and put the application of *shari'ah* to one side.

As has been suggested earlier, branches of the MB can be found in Arab and Middle Eastern countries, Asia, Africa and Europe (Mandaville, 2007, 2014). Although the movements in these various countries have different historical stories and experiences, they are, according to Wiktorowicz, "connected through [a] shared symbolic and ideological linkage" (2001:4). For instance, one of their key similarities is a shared *dakwah* purpose – a focus on Islamising society – although they hold different attitudes regarding certain issues, based on the particular social, cultural, moral and political dynamics and norms of each country. Regardless of their differences in responding to specific issues, they all share the same basic ideologies of the Egyptian MB, including: (1) establishing a unity of religion and politics, (2) the need to apply *shari'ah* in public life, and (3) the need for purification. They also share the basic strategy of the Egyptian MB, which starts by creating Muslim individuals, then Muslim 'families', then finally Muslim societies.

Although most of the MB's branches have been transformed into Islamic political parties, and their broader political significance has grown as a challenge to secular leadership (especially in Muslim societies), they have all still

implemented its private 'educational' (*Tarbiyah*) instrument. Despite the fact that the MB has parties that are prominent in several countries, including Indonesia, the *Tarbiyah* instrument is still the main *dakwah* activity of the movement, and its ideological linkage is shared between MB branches throughout the world.

1.6 Conclusion

This chapter has examined the significance of *dakwah* among Muslims, particularly in contemporary Islamist movements. I have argued that although private and public concepts of *dakwah* have existed and been practised in the history of Islam, these concepts – especially the public concept of *dakwah* – have different meanings for contemporary Islamists. In the past, *dakwah* was primarily concerned with Islam as a monotheistic faith (*tawhid*), and had a universalist message that could be spread to other people, regardless of race, ethnicity, and nationality. In the era of the Prophet, Muhammad was an agent of *dakwah* who received the holy task of spreading the message of Islam. In the periods of the Caliphs and the dynasties of Ummayyad and Abbasyd, the *dakwah* was not conducted by Caliphs and kings alone, but also (and mainly) by well trained, traditional *ulama*, sufis, and other religious experts.

The role that traditional *ulama*, sufis and religious scholars had in conducting *dakwah* changed in the modern period as a result of the impact of modernisation and secularisation brought by colonialism. With the developments of new media, the printing press and information technologies, Muslims became exposed to new religious discourses from *ulama* old and new, as well as modernists and Islamists. Modernists and Islamists challenged and criticised the traditionalists' approach to *dakwah* through their *dakwah* movements. Modern Islamists strongly believe in the need for Muslims to be active in Islamising the public sphere and the state, and the absence of Islamic states, Muslim rulers, and public Islamic teaching are their main concerns.

Islamist *dakwah* movements have played an important role in responding to the absence of Islam from public life that colonialism and secularism led to in Muslim countries. These movements have come to have an influence in both Muslim countries and non-Muslim countries in Europe and America, as well as in other countries that Muslim immigrant and diaspora communities have spread to. The Islamist *dakwah* ideology concerning the strengthening of Islamic identity and the piety of Muslims, together with the creation of a more Islamic form of society, have attracted young people from the urban lower and middle classes. These young urban Muslims perceive this ideology as representing a revision of Islam that is more responsive to the modern period, and that provides a 'better modernity' – one that is more Islamic, religious, spiritual, just and humane. As an Islamist movement, the MB in Egypt has had an impact on the development of contemporary Islamist movements worldwide, attracting large numbers of young Muslims in Egypt and the Middle East as well as in Asia, Africa, and Europe. The MB movements in these countries have similar concerns and ideologies regarding the Islamisation of society and the public sphere.



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Submission ID: 2301422769

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