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ijims ijims
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"Redefining the islamic defenders front's (FPI) identity after its dissolution by the indonesian government"

Abstract
This research aims to understand how identity redefinition occurs and what cultural variables result in identity redefinition.The Indonesian government has disbanded several mass organizations throughout the years. To ensure its survival, the group hid among the crowds. Meanwhile, the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), which the government disbanded in 2020, was renamed the Islamic United Front, and it maintained a milder stance toward the government to survive. Several research has examined the government's rationale for abolishment. However, research on how organizational actors react to their organizations' dissolution is still scarce. The research examined the former Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) members' perceptions of their organization's dissolution by the government in 2020. The study utilized a qualitative research design. The data collection methods included observation, purposeful sampling interviews, and documenting former members' actions and behaviors after the disbandment. The data analysis was performed inductively to ascertain the former FPI members' subjective opinions of the organizational redefinition. The findings indicated that former FPI members reinvented their identity after the government's disbandment as a means of survival by adopting more lenient, accommodating, and inclusive views toward the government and other mass groups. Also, the disintegration of radical religious groups may catalyze a new relationship between radical Islamic organizations and the state.

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#8225 Review

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Abstract	This research aims to understand how identity redefinition occurs and what cultural variables result in identity redefinition.The Indonesian government has disbanded several mass organizations throughout the years. To ensure its survival, the group hid among the crowds. Meanwhile, the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), which the government disbanded in 2020, was renamed the Islamic United Front, and it maintained a milder stance toward the government to survive. Several research has examined the government's rationale for abolishment. However, research on how organizational actors react to their organizations' dissolution is still scarce. The research examined the former Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) members' perceptions of their organization's dissolution by the government in 2020. The study utilized a qualitative research design. The data collection methods included observation, purposeful sampling interviews, and documenting former members' actions and behaviors after the disbandment. The data analysis was performed inductively to ascertain the former FPI members' subjective opinions of the organizational redefinition. The findings indicated that former FPI members reinvented their identity after the government's disbandment as a means of survival by adopting more lenient, accommodating, and inclusive views toward the government and other mass groups. Also, the disintegration of radical religious groups may catalyze a new relationship between radical Islamic organizations and the state.
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Dr. Purwidianto, MA.

Redefining the islamic defenders front's (FPI) identity after its dissolution by the indonesian government

Abstract

This research aims to understand how identity redefinition occurs and what cultural variables result in identity redefinition.The Indonesian government has disbanded several mass organizations throughout the years. To ensure its survival, the group hid among the crowds. Meanwhile, the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), which the government disbanded in 2020, was renamed the Islamic United Front, and it maintained a milder stance toward the government to survive. Several research has examined the government's rationale for abolishment. However, research on how organizational actors react to their organizations' dissolution is still scarce. The research examined the former Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) members' perceptions of their organization's dissolution by the government in 2020. The study utilized a qualitative research design. The data collection methods included observation, purposeful sampling interviews, and documenting former members' actions and behaviors after the disbandment. The data analysis was performed inductively to ascertain the former FPI members' subjective opinions of the organizational redefinition. The findings indicated that former FPI members reinvented their identity after the government's disbandment as a means of survival by adopting more lenient, accommodating, and inclusive views toward the government and other mass groups. Also, the disintegration of radical religious groups may catalyze a new relationship between radical Islamic organizations and the state.

Commented [aa1]: How about the recomendation for firther research on this subject? This Abstact will be good also to include recomendation on similar topik on the same group but in a wider context, are the (FPI) Indonesia similar to FPI or any radical grpup in other part of the world?

Introduction

The collapse of the Islamic Defenders Front (Front Pembela Islam, abbreviated as FPI) by the Indonesian government in 2020 opened a new chapter in the interaction between the state and radical Islamic groups. Numerous previously dissolved radical Islamic groups have redefined their identities to survive by altering the nature of their movement. For instance, Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), which the government disbanded in 2017, chose to remove its organizational symbols to continue operating on college campuses and mosques.[1] To ensure its survival, the group hid among the crowds. Meanwhile, the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), which the government disbanded in 2020, was renamed the Islamic United Front, and it maintained a milder stance toward the government to survive. Similarly, other radical Islamic organizations such as Jamaah Islamiyah, Jamaah Ansharut Daulah, and other Islamic Jihadist organizations ceased after the HTI and FPI bans. According to

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[1] Ali Maksum, "Discourses On Islam And Democracy In Indonesia: A Study on the Intellectual Debate between Liberal Islam Network (JIL) and Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI)," *Journal of Indonesian Islam, 11(2),* 11 (2) (2017): 405–422, http://jiis.uinsby.ac.id/index.php/JIIs/article/view/557.

Islamic scholar Azyumardi Azra, redefining identities is a method used by radical Islamic groups to adapt to the hostile attitude of the governing state.[2] [3]

Previous studies on the redefinition of Islamic groups' identities after their collapse often adopted two distinct perspectives: sociopolitical and security stability. According to studies conducted using the first viewpoint, the official authority has consistently asserted that Islamic groups are misguided and hazardous to Pancasila philosophy.[4] Studies employing the second approach have examined how radical Islamic groups might endanger a country's stability.[5] Our examination of publications under both views revealed that studies of identity redefinition have mostly ignored the subjective perceptions of the disbanded Islamic group members. Leading figures and activists from the banned Islamic groups stated that they have never been invited to discussion before to the government's decision. Therefore, the perspectives of the banned radical organizational actors are critical for establishing a thorough knowledge that enables the formulation of suitable policies to address radical organizations' concerns.

This research aims to understand how identity redefinition occurs and what cultural variables result in identity redefinition. The examination of these issues enables an in-depth understanding of the connection between radical Islamic groups and the state in the context of democratic freedom and civil society reinforcement. Additionally, this understanding assists in developing a more contextual and effective strategy for dealing with similar religious groups.

Redefining identity in response to unfavorable circumstances is a tactic Islamic groups should use when the state and Islamic organizations are at odds. Each side to a dispute has its own interests, which, together with power, will determine the appropriate policy. Similarly, identity redefinition is a tactic for people and religious organizations to change to sustain their existence. Redefining identity may be seen as an organization's adaptive response to structural circumstances and conditions and a process of cultural transformation used as a survival strategy.

Method

The study employed a qualitative research approach to examine how radical Islamic groups redefined their identities after the government dissolved them. Qualitative research generates descriptive data in words and notes on comprehension, meaning, and value.[6] The technique is based on inductive reasoning, with the researcher compiling the abstraction from the obtained data to be further classified. Qualitative approaches were used to

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[2] Achmad Nasrudin Yahya, *Azyumardi Azra: Pembubaran HTI Dan FPI Jadi Peristiwa Penting Dalam Sejarah Gerakan Islam Di Indonesia* (Jakarta, 2021), https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2021/01/15/19374191/azyumardi-azra-pembubaran-hti-dan-fpi-jadi-peristiwa-penting-dalam-sejarah?page=all.

[3] Arthur Garrison, "Terrorism: The Nature of Its History," *Criminal Justice Studies: A Critical Journal of Crime, Law and Society* 16, no. 1 (2003): 39–52.

[4] Bambang Prasetyo, "Pembubaran Hizbut Tahrir Di Indonesia Dalam Perspektif Sosial Politik," *Jurnal Studi Keislaman* 19 (2016): 251–164.

[5] Bayu Marfiando, "Pembubaran Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) Ditinjau Dari Kebebasan Berserikat," *Jurnal Ilmu Kepolisian* 14 (2020): 89.

[6] Kaelan, *Metode Penelitian Kualitatif Bidang Filsafat* (Yogyakarta: Paradigma, 2005).

formulate issues, gather data in the field, analyze the data, synthesize the findings, and compile suggestions.[7]

The study's informants included FPI central administrators and activists in Jakarta, including high priest Habib Rizieq Shihab, former FPI chairman K.H. Sobri Lubis, secretary-general Munarman, deputy secretary-general Novel Bamukmin, FPI lawyer Aziz Yanuar, and several activists going by the pseudonyms Abim, Ahmad, and Ikhwat. The informants consisting of former FPI officials and activists were interviewed in person or over the phone. The snowball sampling approach was used to recruit the informants. The internet, periodicals, and books featuring news regarding the FPI's activities after its disbandment were examined for documentation. The following processes were used to examine the data in this study: data reduction, data visualization, and data verification.[8] The conclusion was obtained by inductive analysis (inference methods), which began with the facts and progressed to conclusions in the form of classification or proposition.[9]

Literature Review
Redefining Identity
Identity is a notion that a person develops as a product of his or her knowledge, internalization of values, emotions, involvement, concern, and pride as a community member.[10] Donovan et al.[11] noted that people's social identities are formed and modified by the political, social, and environmental contexts they interact with, which may influence their emotions and behavior.[12] Through social identification, one's relationship to his or her social group may also redefine one's identity. One's reflection on his or her self-attachment to a group and social identification via the use of symbolic instruments has the potential to promote either a positive or negative attitude toward his or her group.[13] One's social identification creates one's collective identity that is unrelated to his or her self-awareness.[14] It may be seen as a process of identity redefinition, in which people modify their individual and collective identities to become more inclusive.[15]

Numerous studies on the factors that influence the emergence of diverse social movements, particularly those involving the younger generation, have examined the subject

> **Commented [aa4]:** the explanation of citations/references in footnote, justify them and follow the template

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[7] S Danim, *Menjadi Peneliti Kualitatif* (Bandug: Pustaka Setia, 2002).

[8] B. Matheuw Miles and Michale Huberman, *Analisis Data Kualitatif: Buku Sumber Tentang Metode-Metode Kualitatif* (Jakarta: UIP, 2010).

[9] Burhan. Bungin, *Metode Penelitian Kualitatif: Aktualisasi Metodologis Ke Arah Varian Kontemporer* (Jakarta: Raja Grafindo Persada., 2001).

[10] Owen Griffiths and Arif Ahmed, "Introducing Identity," *Journal of Philosophical Logic* (2021); James H. Liu et al., "Living Historical Memory: Associations with National Identity, Social Dominance Orientation, and System Justification in 40 Countries," *Journal of Applied Research in Memory and Cognition* 10, no. 1 (March 2021): 104–116.

[11] "A Crisis of Identity: Social Work Theorising at a Time of Change," *British Journal of Social Work* (2017).

[12] Maruice Mangum and Ray Block, "Social Identity Theory and Public Opinion towards Immigration," *Social Sciences* 7, no. 3 (March 2018): 41.

[13] Jason C. McIntyre et al., "Social Identity and Psychosis: Associations and Psychological Mechanisms," *Schizophrenia Bulletin* 44, no. 3 (April 2018): 681–690.

[14] Elisabetta Crocetti, Francesca Prati, and Monica Rubini, "The Interplay of Personal and Social Identity," *European Psychologist* 23, no. 4 (October 2018): 300–310.

[15] Matthew J. Hornsey, "Social Identity Theory and Self-Categorization Theory: A Historical Review," *Social and Personality Psychology Compass* 2, no. 1 (January 2008): 204–222; Crocetti, Prati, and Rubini, "The Interplay of Personal and Social Identity."

of identity redefinition.[16] Rousseau et al.[17] observed that the complicated link between individuals and social groupings reflected the redefinition of identity. Identity redefinition also indicates social adaptation to considerable changes in interpersonal interaction and communication.[18] Additionally, the redefinition of identity entails collective action that results in structural changes and a shift toward more positive patterns of interaction and communication between people, groups, and the state.[19] The redefinition of identity can be shown through a positive or negative relationship. The negative relationship results from poor identity redefinition, when one's identity emerges, causes confusion, and leads to confrontations between people, organizations, and the state.[20]

Radical Social Movement

Social movements are embodied in social organizations, which have features and are susceptible to a variety of internal and external forces (e.g., organizational structure and value internalization) that impact the group's ability to achieve its objectives.[21] Van Dyke and Amos[22] wrote that social movements do not always rely on social coalitions to mobilize large numbers of people, and these movements frequently emphasize five elements in achieving their goals: (a) social ties; (b) a conducive organizational structure; (c) ideology, culture, and identity; (d) institutional environment; and (e) resources. However, social movements may encounter problems driving their collective movements.[23] These movements sometimes attract dark actors who impact the collective movement's original aims, subsequent resolutions, and policies addressing these social challenges.[24] Thus, the notion of social movements is inextricably tied to a variety of modern social and political

> **Commented [aa5]:** Social Movement Theory can be included in explaining this part, especially regarding the factors that shape them into radical

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[16] Flavia Albarello, Elisabetta Crocetti, and Monica Rubini, "I and Us: A Longitudinal Study on the Interplay of Personal and Social Identity in Adolescence," *Journal of Youth and Adolescence* 47, no. 4 (April 2018): 689–702; Ana Reyes-Menendez, Jose Ramon Saura, and Stephen B. Thomas, "Exploring Key Indicators of Social Identity in the #MeToo Era: Using Discourse Analysis in UGC," *International Journal of Information Management* 54, no. July 2019 (October 2020): 102129; Cécile Rousseau et al., "Collective Identity, Social Adversity and College Student Sympathy for Violent Radicalization," *Transcultural Psychiatry* 58, no. 5 (October 2021): 654–668.

[17] Rousseau et al., "Collective Identity, Social Adversity and College Student Sympathy for Violent Radicalization."

[18] Catherine Haslam et al., "The Importance of Social Groups for Retirement Adjustment: Evidence, Application, and Policy Implications of the Social Identity Model of Identity Change," *Social Issues and Policy Review* 13, no. 1 (January 2019): 93–124.

[19] Clifford Stott et al., "Patterns of 'Disorder' During the 2019 Protests in Hong Kong: Policing, Social Identity, Intergroup Dynamics, and Radicalization," *Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice* 14, no. 4 (February 2021): 814–835.

[20] Griffiths and Ahmed, "Introducing Identity."

[21] N. Zald Mayer and Ash Garner Roberta, "Social Movement Organizations: Growth, Decay, and Change," in *Social Movements in an Organizational Society* (Routledge, 2017), 121–142; Nella Van Dyke and Bryan Amos, "Social Movement Coalitions: Formation, Longevity, and Success," *Sociology Compass* (2017); Michael Yaziji and Jonathan P. Doh, "The Role of Ideological Radicalism and Resource Homogeneity in Social Movement Organization Campaigns against Corporations," *Organization Studies* (2013).

[22] Van Dyke and Amos, "Social Movement Coalitions: Formation, Longevity, and Success."

[23] Matthew Lee, Tommaso Ramus, and Antonino Vaccaro, "From Protest to Product: Strategic Frame Brokerage in a Commercial Social Movement Organization," *Academy of Management Journal* 61, no. 6 (December 2018): 2130–2158.

[24] Erich J. Sommerfeldt and Aimei Yang, "Relationship Networks as Strategic Issues Management: An Issue-Stage Framework of Social Movement Organization Network Strategies," *Public Relations Review* (2017).

forces and their national scenarios according to particular political situations driven by specific interests.[25]

Dissolution of the organization (organizational reform)

In the previous several decades, the relationship between civil society groups and the state has always been complicated.[26] The convoluted connection results from the organizations' and state's different viewpoints on what constitutes a state and welfare, which often results in conflicts between the two sides.[27] Maksum[28] suggested that the establishment of mass organizations in Indonesia must be regulated and be consistent with Pancasila values, the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia (Articles 20-21, 28C paragraph 2, 28E paragraph 3, and 28J), and Law Number 17 of 2013 on community organizations. The government has the authority to dissolve a community group that does not comply with the Pancasila and 1945 Constitution ideals held by the Indonesian people.[29] Farida[30] noted that the disbandment of community groups in Indonesia, such as the FPI and HTI, is a constitutional move since the ideals or ideology of these organizations contradicts the state's values.

According to Law No. 19 of 2017, the government has the jurisdiction to dissolve a deviant communal organization. However, the right does not represent the fundamental foundations of a lawful state that must safeguard its people's freedom to associate.[31] Thus, community groups in Indonesia must adapt their ideas and ideologies to reflect Pancasila's ideals in order to prevent dissolution, even if doing so exacerbates polemics over ensuring citizens' freedom to gather and express their views in democratic governments such as Indonesia.[32] According to Miranda,[33] the government is accountable for overseeing community groups and facilitating the public to report community organizations that

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[25] María Teresa Findji, "From Resistance to Social Movement: The Indigenous Authorities Movement in Colombia," in *The Making of Social Movements in Latin America* (Routledge, 2018), 112–133.

[26] Jessica Leigh Doyle, "State Control of Civil Society Organizations: The Case of Turkey," *Democratization* 24, no. 2 (February 2017): 244–264.

[27] Maksum, "Discourses On Islam And Democracy In Indonesia: A Study on the Intellectual Debate between Liberal Islam Network (JIL) and Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI)"; Tomi Setiawan and Asep Risnandar, "Negara Modern, Dan Utopia Negara Khilafah(?)," *Jurnal Kajian Peradaban Islam* 2, no. 2 (August 2019): 6–12; Mochamad Thoyyib, "Radikalisme Islam Indonesia," *TA'LIM : Jurnal Studi Pendidikan Islam* (2018).

[28] "Discourses On Islam And Democracy In Indonesia: A Study on the Intellectual Debate between Liberal Islam Network (JIL) and Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI)."

[29] Nabih Amer and Rahmat Teguh Santoso Gobel, "Pembubaran Organisasi Kemasyarakatan Perspektif Siyasah Syar'iyyah Dan Negara Hukum," *Al-Mizan* (2019).

[30] "Konstitusionalitas Pembubaran Organisasi Kemasyarakatan Melalui Surat Keputusan (Beschikking)," *Al-qanun: Jurnal Pemikiran dan Pembaharuan Hukum Islam* 24, no. 1 (2021): 170–197.

[31] Nabih Amer, "Analisis Pembubaran Organisasi Kemasyarakatan Dalam Perspektif Negara Hukum," *Jurnal Legalitas* 13, no. 01 (2020): 1–15.

[32] Vania Miranda, "Tinjauan Yuridis Terhadap Pembubaran Organisasi Masyarakat Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI)" 00, no. 4 (2019): 1–6; Aini Kusuma Wardani, "Analisis Pembubaran Organisasi Kemasyarakatan Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia Dalam Perspektif Negara Hukum Yang Bebas Berserikat," *Jurnal Hukum dan Pembangunan Ekonomi* 9, no. 1 (July 2021): 1; Farida, "Konstitusionalitas Pembubaran Organisasi Kemasyarakatan Melalui Surat Keputusan (Beschikking)."

[33] Miranda, "Tinjauan Yuridis Terhadap Pembubaran Organisasi Masyarakat Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI)."

violate state ideology and law. According to Hamzah,[34] although the dissolution of a community organization such as the FPI is motivated by philosophical, sociological, and legal considerations, polemics over people's ability to organize, gather, and express ideas may sometimes arise.

Results

FPI's dissolution has opened a new chapter in the growth of Islamic organizations and the interaction between the state and Islamic groups. FPI's answer, in the form of a redefinition of its identity, demonstrated a significant shift in the organization's attitude and direction. The FPI's redefinition of identity may be summarized in three major changes: (1) redefining the organization (structure and organizational spirit), (2) redefining policies and programs, and (3) redefining the organization's relationship with authority.

Reconceptualization of FPI Organization: Structure and Organizational Culture

At the end of 2020, the Indonesian government formally disbanded the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI). As a result, FPI 'dissolved' its structure and renamed and reorganized its operations. The Islamic Defenders Front was renamed the United Islamic Front and then the Islamic Brotherhood Front, both of which were also abbreviated as FPI. FPI's solicitor, Aziz Yanuar, indicated that the name change resulted from a mutual agreement and the counsel of Habib Rizieq Shihab.[35] According to Agustin (2021), the shift from 'defender' to 'unity' and then 'brotherhood' represents a reorientation of the FPI organization toward a more communal or cultural orientation. According to Habib Rizieq Shihab, genuine brotherhood encompasses both defense and unity.[36] The FPI's swift reaction to the disbandment by creating a new organization demonstrated that the government succeeded in disbanding the organization procedurally but not dismantling its philosophy. Indeed, FPI continues to operate under its new name and initiatives.[37]

The defunct Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) and the new Islamic Brotherhood Front (FPI) have a similar vision and objective. Both organizations seek to "apply Islamic precepts in all facets of life." The objective of the former Islamic Defender Front is to thoroughly implement *al-amr bi al-maʿruf wa an-nahy ʿan al-munkar* (commanding what is lawful and prohibiting what is evil) in all spheres of human existence (*kaffah*). The group intended to nurture good people (*salihat*) who live in a prosperous country and receive an abundance of blessings and the pleasure of God (*baldat tayyibah wa rabb ghafur*). However, the new FPI introduced a new orientation in its Articles of Association toward manifesting *Islam rahmatan li al-alamin* by protecting Islam and Pancasila from liberalism, atheism, communism, capitalism, and extremism. The reorientation has undoubtedly transformed the new FPI from an organization identified with a stern and uncompromising attitude to one that is tolerant of social diversity and devoted to defending Indonesia and Pancasila

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[34] Ahmadi Hamzah, "Analisis Yuridis Surat Keputusan Bersama Menteri Tentang Pembubaran Organisasi Masyarakat Front Pembela Islam," *Qiyas* 6 (2021): 19–24.
[35] Sachril Agustin, *FPI Ganti Nama Lagi, Front Persatuan Islam Jadi Front Persaudaraan Islam* (Jakara, 2021), https://news.detik.com/berita/d-5321568/fpi-ganti-nama-lagi-front-persatuan-islam-jadi-front-persaudaraan-islam.
[36] Ibid.
[37] Chairul Fikri, *FPI Ganti Nama Lagi Menjadi Front Persaudaraan Islam* (Jakarta, 2021), https://www.beritasatu.com/nasional/716669/fpi-ganti-nama-lagi-menjadi-front-persaudaraan-islam.

doctrine. The goal of the Islamic Brotherhood Front is the creation of a complete Islamic life that functions as a blessing for the whole world (*rahmatan li al-alamin*) and deepens the Indonesians' brotherhood. The organization's purpose is to implement Islamic principles in all parts of life, emphasizing humanity, justice, brotherhood, and unity.[38]

FPI's political actions were manifested in its advocacy for a sharia-ruled Indonesia. This objective demands FPI members to educate and nurture individuals following the Islamic law and protect them from the impact of sin and wrongful acts of exploitation. Islamic law was imposed on society by demonstrating that tolerating tyranny would result in moral damage to the community and by elucidating how Islamic law is administered. At least 64 disputed violent actions were committed by members of the Laskar Pembela Islam, FPI's paramilitary army, including the closure of nightclubs, brothels, and food stalls, the threat and imprisonment of particular nationalities, and clashes with other religious-based groups. Unsurprisingly, many political parties see the FPI as a symbol of aggressive conduct in religious preaching. The new FPI attempted to improve on the organization's previous unpleasant and strict reputation. During the declaration, FPI High Priest Habib Rizieq Shihab said that the new FPI must prioritize the movement's three pillars: humanity, education (*da'wah*), and law and human rights. Additionally, K.H. Sobri Lubis, FPI Chairperson, stressed that the new FPI must exhibit delicate, courteous, and elegant organizational conduct and adhere to the law in its da'wah.[39]

Changes in FPI's Policy and Work Program

FPI has been exploring symbolic Islamic fanaticism in its organizational activities since its founding. As a result, the FPI's political activities reflect their emotional attachment, mass power, and group interests. The emotional bond is established by a series of the regular group Islamic studies and direct actions aimed at prohibiting wrongdoings in the society (*an-nahy 'an al-munkar*). FPI's efforts in each social movement underline its members' outrage and disappointment at the governing regime for failing to take necessary action/decisions when addressing specific socio-political situations. Following the government's prohibition, FPI's social activities and actions shifted toward prevention, emphasizing *al-amr bi al-ma'ruf* (commanding the right), such as assisting flood victims in East Jakarta's Kampung Cipinang Melayu and cleaning Bethel Petamburan Church.

The FPI's movements revolved around its leaders and sub-organizations. Habib Rizieq Sihab, the founder, general chairman, and high priest of the FPI, is the organization's central figure. His superb speeches serve as a magnet for the group, although his policies often result in societal polemics. Meanwhile, the FPI's main sub-organization is made up of paramilitary forces that are very devoted to Habib Rizieq Shihab. Following the government's prohibition, the paramilitary organization ceased aggressive and physical operations while increasing their social and humanitarian activities.

FPI seeks to create Islamic law and Islamic governance. As a result, FPI's efforts include both social and political dimensions. The FPI's desire to defend the Islamic system within the multicultural setting of Indonesia resulted in the organization's exclusive and intolerant attitudes against other religious organizations. FPI's work promoting the

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[38] FPI, *Anggaran Dasar Front Persaudaraan Islam (FPI)* (Jakarta, Jakarta, 2021), https://www.faktakini.info/2021/09/anggaran-dasar-front-persaudaraan-islam.html.
[39] Fikri, *FPI Ganti Nama Lagi Menjadi Front Persaudaraan Islam*.

Commented [aa6]: this result is a main point that need to be supported by extensive data and long record of FPI's activities and attitudes

implementation of Islamic principles and rules in Indonesia grew the organization into an exclusive and self-righteous entity. Following the prohibition, the FPI rebranded itself and engaged in political, economic, educational, and social activities.

Redefining the Relationship between Organization and Authority

Azis Yanuar, FPI's attorney, claimed that the group would not register with the Ministry of Home Affairs. Article 28e paragraph (3) of the 1945 Constitution mentioned that everyone has the right to join, gather, and express his or her rights. According to Yanuar, the Constitutional Court's 2013 judgment No. 82, Article 16 paragraph (3) and Article 18 of the mass organization legislation, which requires all groups to get a registration certificate (SKT), violates the 1945 Constitution. Organizations that do not have a registration certificate (SKT) are not registered but are not immediately considered defunct.

FPI maintained a non-confrontational approach toward the government after its second founding in mid-2021. The group was not outspoken in its opposition to the government's policies. For instance, the group did not march in the streets in response to recent political events, such as the government's inadequate management of the Covid-19 pandemic and the halal status of the Covid-19 vaccination.

Abu Fihir Alattas emphasized in the statement that all FPI guardians, members, and supporters should avoid needless battles with the tyrannical dictatorship, and the Islamic United Front was established to preserve religion, country, and state in line with Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution. The FPI declarator's comment showed that the new FPI favored an accommodating rather than combative stance toward the government. The new Islamic Brotherhood Front (FPI) adheres to five philosophical tenets: (1) preserving the religion and country, (2) da'wah and Islamic education, (3) law enforcement and human rights, (4) humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and (5) the establishment of honest and trustworthy media (Statutes of the Islamic Brotherhood Front).[40]

Discussion

In Indonesia, the FPI is regarded as a socio-religious movement that regularly resorts to violence. It is the adversarial face of Islam. This research demonstrates that when the disbanded FPI, it transformed into a more flexible, graceful, and inclusive organization. Redefining identities is necessary for FPI to be viable and maintain its existence. FPI's resumption of programs and activities is facilitated by changing its direction.

The organization's dissolution does not automatically extinguish the FPI's philosophy and fighting spirit. On the contrary, the congregation's spirit became stronger after the dissolution. The fans thought they were battling for the truth. The organization's name changes from 'defender' to 'unity' and later to 'brotherhood' represents a reorientation toward a more communal or cultural orientation. Shihab equated these three names because genuine brotherhood entails self-defense and unity. The FPI leaders' swift reaction in organizing a new organization demonstrates that the government successfully disbanded the FPI's organization procedurally but failed to stifle its philosophy substantially. This demonstrates that FPI can resume operations via its new structure and initiatives.[41]

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[40] FPI, *Anggaran Dasar Front Persaudaraan Islam (FPI)*.
[41] Fikri, *FPI Ganti Nama Lagi Menjadi Front Persaudaraan Islam*.

As witnessed in the establishment of the new FPI, the internalization of ideals is a structural attempt by FPI leaders to elicit emotion and support from former FPI members. Members' active participation in the new organization demonstrates their commitment to and connection with the political course championed by the FPI leaders. The straightforward name change might be seen as a means of accommodating and channeling congregational feelings and involvement. The congregation's identity was reconstructed via a new structure, gentler techniques, and the avoidance of direct confrontation. FPI's approach evolved as a consequence of its internalization of values, emotions, involvement, concern, and pride as a member of a government-banned group.[42]

As stated in its articles of association, the new FPI's emphasis on propagating *Islam rahmatan li al-alamin prompted* the organization to adopt more accommodating techniques in dealing with societal divisions and Pancasila philosophy. Through its Laskar Pembela Islam sub-organization, the former FPI was infamous for its violent deeds. Before 2014, over 64 acts of violence had been committed, cementing FPI's reputation as a symbol of aggressive conduct in the name of religion. According to Habib Rizieq Shihab, the new FPI is founded on three fundamental principles: humanity, education (da'wah), and law and human rights. K.H. Sobri Lubis, the new FPI chairman, desired FPI members to teach Islam with courteous, elegant, law-abiding, gentle, and inclusive demeanor.[43]

FPI's reconceptualization is inextricably linked to its political and social setting. Following the FPI's disbandment, its leaders faced three challenges: preserving their beliefs and philosophy, avoiding open conflict with the government, and balancing with the larger community's social interest, which regarded them as violent and illegal community organizations. FPI leaders formed a new organization to preserve the banned FPI's philosophy, congregation, and network of connection among its members. Additionally, the new FPI altered its social interaction pattern by stressing kinder and more open attitudes in response to its negative reputation in society. Thus, attempts to forge a new social identity via a new branding have been attempted by culturally and structurally reinventing the style, appearance, and reconceptualization of the FPI movement. The social environment impacts emotions and conduct.[44] FPI leaders' attempt to re-conceptualize the congregation's emotions and behavior has an effect on the organization's look.

The FPI Reborn's social adjustment activities correspond to Van Dyke and Amos'[45] phases in accomplishing an organization's objectives. During the organization's first creation stage, the revived FPI recognized social linkages that united its congregations. Social links are formed based on kinship and shared destiny, ethnic origin, religion, and madhhab in religious practice. Depending on these social links, an organization's structure was established and subsequently legitimized by the constitution and norms governed by the ministries of home affairs and law and human rights in Indonesia. The next step is to purify ideology, identity, and culture to conform to the majority's beliefs and not infringe national laws. The next step is to establish a secure culture, identity, and philosophy. The

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[42] Donovan, Rose, and Connolly, "A Crisis of Identity: Social Work Theorising at a Time of Change"; Griffiths and Ahmed, "Introducing Identity"; Liu et al., "Living Historical Memory: Associations with National Identity, Social Dominance Orientation, and System Justification in 40 Countries."

[43] Fikri, *FPI Ganti Nama Lagi Menjadi Front Persaudaraan Islam.*

[44] Mangum and Block, "Social Identity Theory and Public Opinion towards Immigration."

[45] Van Dyke and Amos, "Social Movement Coalitions: Formation, Longevity, and Success."

two last phases are to remodel the institutional environment, including administrative functions, and realign current resources with the organizational strategy. Following this line of thought, the resurrected FPI effectively altered its ideological indoctrination and identity patterns, which were previously seen as aggressive and anti-Indonesian. Instead of insisting on being a disembodied organization, the FPI opted to demonstrate its pragmatic political side by abiding by the government's regulations.

This is in stark contrast to Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), which has remained politically neutral. Nonetheless, HTI groups periodically demonstrate their presence and purpose to create an Islamic caliphate in specific locations. For instance, the Nahdlatul Ulama Regional Board president in East Nusa Tenggara requested the police to arrest banned HTI members who disseminated propaganda movies and engaged in propaganda activities in East Nusa Tenggara.[46] Numerous issues may arise due to the complicated connection between civil society groups and the state.[47] For instance, despite the government's disbandment of HTI and the backing of 99 percent of Indonesians, HTI's radical ideology did not completely vanish from Indonesia.[48] HTI and the government's divergent perspectives on defining a state and citizen welfare exacerbate an already complicated relationship. As a consequence, a contradiction developed between the state/government and the imagination of state defined by HTI group.[49]

The act of redefining one's identity affects individuals associated with the defunct group and strengthens the connection to symbols associated with the group (figures, ideologies, and norms). FPI members' adjustment and collective identities as inclusive identities are influenced by their connection to the symbol.[50] Crocetti's[51] and Hornsey's[52] perspectives are mirrored in one informant's answer, who said that the FPI congregation's spirit has grown stronger after its disbandment. They believed they were fighting for a type of truth, as shown by the government's decision to dissolve the group (Abim, Informant from Bali). Collectively, the establishment of mass organizations in Indonesia must be regulated and guided by Pancasila values, under the Preamble to the 1945 Constitution, Article 20-21 of the 1945 Constitution, Article 28 of the 1945 Constitution, Article 28C paragraph (2) of the 1945 Constitution, Article 28E paragraph (3) of the 1945 Constitution, and Law Number 17 of 2013 concerning community organizations.[53] Individuals' faith in the group and eagerness to re-engage in a new forum demonstrates that the disbandment does not preclude them from exercising their rights. As a result, it is

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[46] Benediktus Sridin Suhu Jahang, *NU Dorong Kepolisian Proses Hukum Ketua HTI Di NTT* (NTT, 2020), https://www.antaranews.com/berita/1527612/nu-dorong-kepolisian-proses-hukum-ketua-hti-di-ntt.

[47] Doyle, "State Control of Civil Society Organizations: The Case of Turkey."

[48] I. Artharini, *Lebih Dari 90% Orang Indonesia Dukung Penolakan HTI Dan ISIS* (Jakarta, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/indonesia/indonesia-40153060.

[49] Maksum, "Discourses On Islam And Democracy In Indonesia: A Study on the Intellectual Debate between Liberal Islam Network (JIL) and Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI)"; Setiawan and Risnandar, "Negara Modern, Dan Utopia Negara Khilafah(?)"; Thoyyib, "Radikalisme Islam Indonesia."

[50] Crocetti, Prati, and Rubini, "The Interplay of Personal and Social Identity"; Hornsey, "Social Identity Theory and Self-Categorization Theory: A Historical Review."

[51] Crocetti, Prati, and Rubini, "The Interplay of Personal and Social Identity."

[52] Hornsey, "Social Identity Theory and Self-Categorization Theory: A Historical Review."

[53] Maksum, "Discourses On Islam And Democracy In Indonesia: A Study on the Intellectual Debate between Liberal Islam Network (JIL) and Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI)."

Commented [aa7]: this is a great contribution regarding identity as the main issue in this research

impossible to prevent the formation of FPI cells that advocate for the application of Indonesian sharia law.

Conclusion

Disbanding Islamic groups having a radical leaning has been shown to be ineffective in ending their existence and operations. This research demonstrates that the FPI continues to exist after the government disbanded it, as shown by its continuous operations and new modifications it made after the disbandment. The policy of identity redefinition is pursued to survive in the face of governmental hegemony, which is hostile to radical organizations. The extreme acts of the FPI cannot be separated from structural and cultural issues, including (1) the government's lack of attention to and slow response to poverty, oppression, and immorality, and (2) the congregation's ideological indoctrination.

This study has presented a novel viewpoint on radicalism by examining it from the perpetrator's standpoint to account for the subjective perspective. Accepting the perpetrator's point of view enables us to comprehend the background and motivations for extremism. Since this article focuses on a single topic, informant, technique, and location, comparisons are difficult. Indeed, a comparison of identity redefinitions is necessary to understand the problem better. As a result, more research is needed that considers other variables, such as gender, various age groups, and combination methodologies to build a more successful counter-radicalization program.

Declaration of Interest Statement

The authors declare no conflicts of interest.

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Awarded to:

Ai Fatimah Nur Fuad, Lc., MA., Ph. D.

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